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**COMMANDER SERVICE FORCE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET**

**SERIAL: 00397**

**31 DECEMBER 1962**

**CUBAN QUARANTINE OPERATIONS**


**FORWARDS, WITH COMMENT, NARRATIVE REPORT OF  
LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED ATLANTIC FLEET  
COMMANDS AND UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THESE  
OPERATIONS 15 OCTOBER - 1 DECEMBER 1962.**

COMMANDER SERVICE FORCE  
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET  
Norfolk 11 Virginia

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From: Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet  
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet (10 copies)

Subj: Documentation of Cuban Operations (U)

Ref: (a) CINCLANTFLT Msg 042020Z

Encl: (1) Documentary of Cuban Operations

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.
2. The following is a summary of the significant conclusions and recommendations:

a. Maintenance.

(1) TAO Communications - The SCR-624 radio is bulky and difficult to assemble and is particularly difficult for inexperienced merchant crews to assemble.

Recommendation - That 10 small portable units in the UHF or VHF range be provided COMSERVLANT for contingency use.

(2) Funding Supply Overhauls - Continued non-funding of deficiencies developed by supply overhauls results in more and more depletion of on board spares without replacement.

Recommendation - That funds be made available for funding of supply overhaul deficiencies.

b. Fleet Freight - The two SERVLANT AK ships are committed to support the deployed FBM tender complex. Consequently, no organic shipping was available to establish a regular and direct delivery of surface freight to task force units at sea.

Recommendation - Based on the problems encountered in moving surface freight, a strong need exists in SERVLANT for additional AK type

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ships, having underway transfer capability, for use in direct delivery of freight and personnel to units at sea.

c. Mail - Postal service within CONUS is provided almost exclusively through the civil postal system which is not geared nor staffed for flexibility or mobility necessary to adequately provide service at points other than normal fleet bases. There is no pool of Navy Postal personnel, either ashore or afloat, that can be shifted on short notice to handle mail or to augment Navy post offices overseas as necessary to handle the increased workload due to fleet concentrations.

Recommendation - That two experienced postal clerks (PC1) be added to COMSERVLANT allowance to be used as "trouble shooters" during fleet exercises or other operations involving a large number of ships. These men would be available to be sent to the theatre of operation to assist local post office as feasible. Their most important function would be to provide on-scene coordination and keep COMSERVLANT advised of problem areas as they develop and possibly prevent certain situations from becoming critical. Further, that afloat units be prepared to provide postal clerk assistance for force mail at shore based post offices during critical periods.

d. Provisions and Stores - The study of using Mayport as a base of operations for both the AKS and AF ships indicated that lack of facilities rendered this plan infeasible. Therefore, it was determined to revert to using Norfolk for support of both type ships.

No serious problems were encountered in AF operations; however the receiving of requisitions being delivered to the AKS proved to be a serious problem due to the wide dispersal and rotation of units.

Recommendation - Develop a rapid means of transmission of requisitions to the AKS within the Task Force area of operations. Delivery of requisitions by aircraft beyond the range of helicopters appears to offer a more acceptable means than via rapid data transmission. This area should be explored.

e. Communications - Much will be written about the pyramiding rate of traffic in all commands during the Cuban operation. As a result of experience gained during this operation it is hoped that some progress in the communication problem can be realized.

#### Recommendations

(1) That NAVCOMSTA's give preferential handling to messages conveying OPORDS and Plans over other messages of equal precedence.

(2) That the Force Commander establish a Broadcast for distributing traffic to the ships under his control and originating from his command.

(3) Install on-line transmitting equipment in the major URG ships.

f. SERVDIV 21 - Experience gained from the Cuban Operation revealed that the planned accomplishment of underway replenishment support of the Fleet during contingency operations utilizing only two URG Commanders is infeasible on a continuing basis.

Recommendation - That the Chief Staff Officer for COMSERVRON TWO be a Captain with recent AO/AF/AKS command experience and a Commander be designated for Operations and Plans. This would provide a cadre for a SERVDIV COMMANDER within the staff of COMSERVRON TWO able to be activated on short notice for contingency operations.

g. Ordnance - Many lessons concerning ordnance were learned or reaffirmed during the operations. A few of the main lessons were:

(1) It is necessary to conduct periodic, full scale tactical drills involving preparation and loading of ordnance up to the point of aircraft launch or firing. The full extent of ordnance problems will not be known, or apparent until drills such as this are conducted routinely. Drills would be invaluable training for ordnance handling crews, would demonstrate the capability of the launching systems, and would have demonstrated such inconsistencies as the incompatibility of the MBR with electric fuzes, the requirements for old style bombs with box fins and the requirements for delay fuzes.

(2) Last minute tactical or operational decisions create awkward support problems. Although the requirements for special ordnance caused by the shift of aircraft squadrons or ships to different bases can be easily determined in the planning stages, the physical problems of logistics may prevent rapid provision of requirements during emergency operations. The unplanned build-up of air squadrons in Florida just prior to the operations necessitated the eventual movement of over 1000 tons of ammunition to these bases in about 10 days and in part contributed to the weakening of the Seven Mile Bridge to Key West. The fuze changes in CVA's partially disarmed the bomb stocks of two AE's (for about ten days) until replacement fuzes could be air shipped to the Caribbean and reloaded. The large demand for 5"/38 reduced charges, BL and T/P, and WP stripped the East Coast supply of these items. Replacement stocks were trucked from West Coast stocks. The NGFS requirements exceeded the East Coast stocks of 8" projectiles. As a complicating factor, some of the stocks shipped to fill these requirements were unserviceable and had to be reworked at East Coast depots prior to issue.

(3) Centralized issue control of ammunition in critical supply is mandatory to ensure equitable and effective distribution. By means of the control of critical items such as missiles, ASROC, torpedoes, bomb fuzes, and the relation of CLOUD to Navy stocks by COMSERVLANT an equitable distribution to support all users were achieved. Without this control, some operational commanders would not have received adequate stocks. A case in point is the earmarking of all Navy stocks in East Coast depots to CLOUD VA first.

(4) CVA and AE loads require review and revision. The early requirement for old style bombs and box fins for use by A3D aircraft revealed an inadequacy in the CVA load for these bombs and fins and in the AE load for these fins. The requirement for photo cartridges and SUS must also be studied.

(5) The full extent of shortages in war reserve ammunition stocks will not be accurately known until these stocks are physically segregated, inventoried and reported. Earmarking of CLOUD ammunition stock at the various depots was made on book inventory information. The actual movement of these stocks disclosed additional shortages and highlighted the problems involved in a manner impossible to achieve in any other way.

(6) Navy communications circuits were overloaded. The MILSTRIP message requisitioning procedures, requiring repetitive coding for each line item and a limit of seven line items per message as well as the built-in susceptibility to garble, were a contributing factor. Ammunition requisitioning procedures could be simplified by

(a) Providing complete coding for the first line item and, where all other coding remains constant, providing only serial number, stock number, unit of issue and quantity for subsequent line items.

(b) Including all line item requisitions in the same message.

This procedure is normally used by ammunition activities for telephone transmittal of MILSTRIP.

(7) Mobile Construction Battalion basic ammunition allowances do not include ammunition in consonance with USMC ammunition logistics doctrine and for recently furnished NATO weapons. As of 18 November ammunition was not available in the Navy supply system to provide complete basic allowance and 15 day combat assault follow-on supply for MCBs SIX and SEVEN.

#### Recommendations

(1) Fleet Commanders conduct full scale tactical drills involving ordnance

(2) Fleet Commanders ensure timely submission of ordnance logistic requirements in consonance with their OPLANS.

(3) COMSERVLANT and COMNAVAIRLANT review AE and CVA load lists.

(4) BUWEPs expedite segregation and wall to wall inventory of NAD earmarked stocks.

(5) CINCLANTFLT provide COMSERVLANT with up to date information of the PIM of all combatant and auxiliary shipping in similar emergencies.


(6) BUWEPS obtain authorization for the MILSTRIP requisitioning procedure outlined in paragraph (6) above.

(7) a. MCB ammunition basic allowance be reviewed and refined to list actual requirements including NATO weapon ammunition, and be promulgated.

b. Ammunition to support MCBs be procured and designated in reserve by BUWEPS in the ammunition supply system in locations specified by COMCBLANT.

3. Additional conclusions and recommendations are contained in Annexes K and L of enclosure (1). Where required, additional separate actions are being or have been initiated by COMSERVLANT based upon lessons learned in this operation.

4. Rarely does a fleet have an opportunity to test its plans to the extent done in the Cuban Crisis. In this instance, realistic actions were required at all echelons which comprise readiness of the fleet to take the final step in execution of a plan. With the realization that plans are merely a point of departure for operations, this "crisis" provided valuable information with which to improve logistic support planning for the fleet.

  
DENYS W. KNOLL

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Enclosure (1) to  
COMSERVLANT ltr ser  
31/00397 of 31081-6

COMSERVLANT DOCUMENTARY OF CUBAN OPERATIONS

On 15 October 1962, Commander Service Squadron FOUR (Captain O.R. COLE, Jr.) with Staff and Detachment 95 of Helicopter Utility Squadron FOUR (HU-4) from NAS Lakehurst embarked in USS TRUCKEE (AO-147) in compliance with orders from Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and sailed for the Caribbean area to provide mobile logistic support for the PHIBRIGLEX-62 exercise. For this exercise, Captain COLE was designated CTF 149. In addition to TRUCKEE, this force included USS SABINE (AO-25), USS MAZAMA (AE-9) and USS ALDEBARAN (AF-10). While enroute to Vieques and while passing through the fringe of hurricane ELLA, this task force replenished units of the ASW, Striking and Amphibious force assigned to the PHIBRIGLEX-62 exercise. Although the heavy seas encountered during this period provided many hair raising incidents, all replenishment operations were executed without a single personnel casualty and with only a few minor material casualties.

On 22 October 1962, the USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) and destroyer screen unexpectedly joined the exercise task force and by direction of COMCARDIV SIX, Commander Service Squadron FOUR commenced providing logistic support to this group.

In compliance with directives from Commander SECOND Fleet and Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander Service Squadron TWO (Captain J.F. DALTON) departed Norfolk at 241500R October 1962 for Task Force 136 operations vicinity 25N 67W. Forces assigned, and either enroute or on station: NFO SHO/KASKASKIA/ELOKOMIN/KANKAKEE/CHIKASKIA/GREAT SITKIN/BIDDLE/KENNEDY/STEINAKER/CECIL/STICKELL. Though accurate Quarantine Station assignments were not known due to communications delay, the Northern and Southern Limits had been determined and an underway replenishment plan was prepared dividing the Quarantine Line into 3 segments, with each segment to be serviced by an oiler. This concept was approved by CTF 136, VADM A.G. WARD, USN and CTG 136.1, RADM J.W. AILES, USN and was placed in effect on arrival.

On Monday, October 22, 1962, the President announced the intended U. S. quarantine of Cuba. RADM Denys W. KNOLL, USN, COMSERVLANT, ordered activation of the SERVLANT War Room at 0800R that morning. It was the nerve center for logistic support operations.

USS HYADES, commanded by CAPT G.M. HAGERMAN, USN, completed off-loading Project MIGHT material at GTMO and began preparation for refresher training.

During a visit to HYADES, on the evening of 21 October, CO, NAVSTA GTMO indicated that if evacuation of GTMO dependents was ordered, HYADES would be called upon to embark evacuees. The following morning at 0800R, COMNAVBASE GTMO, RADM E. J. O'DONNELL, USN, held a conference with his staff and the Commanding Officers of USS HYADES, DUXBURY BAY and the Master of the USNS UPSHUR, informing them that dependent evacuation was to commence at 1100R. The evacuation element was to be composed of the above ships plus DESOTO COUNTY.

Dependent personnel had been so thoroughly prepared in advance by written directive and drill exercise that upon signal of evacuation at 1100R on 22 October, dependent families began arriving by bus on the pier one hour after



evacuation had been ordered. It was evident that advance preparation had been more than adequately planned. The evacuees were quiet, orderly and immediately responsive to commands. They arrived, in most cases, with scarcely more than a pre-packed suitcase in hand, a tropical sunsuit on their backs, a pair of sandals and an occasional Raggedy-Ann doll.

A total of 290 evacuees, a number far in excess of HYADES lift capacity, was received on board between the hours of 1200 and 1445 on 22 October. The eldest evacuee was a 70 year old retired Civil Service employee and the youngest, a four-day old infant, whose age was doubled by the time the voyage was completed.

Sortie was effected at 1600R on 22 October without incident. On 25 October, approximately nine hours prior to arrival CONUS, rendezvous in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras was effected with the fleet tug SHAKORI and the USS OPPORTUNE (AKS-41) to transfer warm clothing for the returning dependents. This donated clothing was made available through the generous response of the people of the Norfolk communities. Debarkation of evacuees was completed within 45 minutes of the ship's docking on 25 October.

In order to support COMPHIBLANT's 314 OPLAN, the USS MOSOPELEA (ATF-158) was sailed to Charleston, South Carolina to arrive on 27 October; on the same date the USS SALINAN (ATF-161) was positioned in New Orleans; USS SHAKORI (ATF-162) and USS ATA KAPA (ATF-149) positioned in Little Creek.

Ships assigned to support COMPHIBLANT's 314 salvage plan were USS PRESERVER (ARS-8) in Norfolk, USS WINDLASS (ARSD-4) and USS SENECA (ATF-91) in Little Creek and USS PAPAGO (ATF-160) and USS LUISENO (ATF-156) in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. All ships received their assignments and were ready to deploy on short notice, with the exception of LUISENO who would be ready about 1 November 1962.

By 27 October SERVRON EIGHT ships were positioned for salvage or towing operations in ports covering the southern coast of the U. S. from New Orleans to Norfolk and also in Guantanamo Bay. To further increase the salvage capabilities in the Cuban area, WINDLASS departed Norfolk enroute Mayport, Florida to serve as a ready salvage unit.

COMSERVLANT requested from MSTIS four tankers--two "black" (NSFO) and two "white" (JP-5) to resupply the underway replenishment groups. On 24 October the MSTIS tankers CHEPACHET, PECOS, PIONEER VALLEY and HENRY were assigned. The TAOs were scheduled to refill at Naval Fuel Depot, Jacksonville or specific Caribbean ports as dictated by circumstances. COMSERVLANT recommended that one AO be shifted from TF 136 to TF 135 due to the expected arrival of the Pacific Amphibious Forces.

On 24 October 1962, Task Force 135 was activated for the purpose of participating in the Cuban Operation. On 25 October 1962, the exercise Task Force 149 was formally dissolved. Commander Service Squadron FOUR was designated as Commander Task Group 135.3 under RADM R. J. STROH and later RADM J. T. HAYWARD, 135 Task Force Commander, and a long period of hard work commenced for the SERVLANT units assigned.

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Commander Service Squadron TWO (Captain Joseph F. DALTON, USN), relieved Commanding Officer, USS ELOKOMIN (AO-55) CAPT W. O. SPEARS, USN as Commander Task Group 136.3 at 271200R.

USS NEOSHO (AO-143) rendezvoused with USS CANBERRA (CAG-2) approximately 271500R and CTG 136.3 highlined to CANBERRA for a conference with CTG 136.1. Firm station assignments and locations of hunter killer groups were obtained.

KASKASKIA, while enroute rendezvous with CTG 136.3, was diverted for much needed replenishment of USS RANDOLPH.

On 26 October USS NESPELEN (AOG-55) commenced off-loading POL products in preparation for having its tanks cleaned for JP-4 for use as reserve stock for Key West. NESPELEN was also positioned at Key West as a source of support of USS ANTIETAM if required.

USS ALLAGASH (AO-97) was sent to Newport for modification of her station 6 boom for the double hose JP-5 rig. Cleaning of tanks and installation of two "A" frames for handling carrier span wire rigs were completed on USS NESPELEN (AOG-55) and she sailed for Key West loaded with JP-4 fuel. Two USNS tankers were returned to MSTs; the PECOS and HENRY were retained for JP-5 and NSFO backup. Arrangements were made to position a barge at Morehead City with 20,000 barrels of NSFO on board to provide fuel support for fleet units at that port. CNO authorized reactivation of San Juan POL facility to have a capacity of 19.6 thousand barrels of NSFO, 13.7 thousand barrels of AVGAS, 4.6 thousand barrels of diesel oil and 9.1 thousand barrels of MOGAS.

By 28 October, the replenishment concept, utilizing ELOKOMIN and CHIKASKIA in the southern most sector, NEOSHO and KANKAKEE in middle sector, and KASKASKIA in the northern sector was operating satisfactorily. All forces assigned to TF 136 including the 2 HUK groups, had been fueled.

On 29 October, CTG 136.3 conferred with CTF 136, VADM A. G. WARD, USN on board USS NEWPORT NEWS concerning the re-positioning of the quarantine line in a new position just north and east of the Bahama Islands and utilizing 7 stations vice the original 14 stations.

These stations extended from a point 95 miles north of San Juan, to a point 220 miles southeast from Mayport with a total length of 825 miles.

CTG 136.3 revised the centers of underway replenishment operations to conform to the new areas of quarantine operations. At an afternoon conference with CTG 136.1 on CANBERRA the new assignments were concurred in and subject plan was then promulgated.

On the execution of CTF 136's revised quarantine station assignments at 291830R, ELOKOMIN proceeded vicinity 20-40N 67-40W and assumed responsibility for "CHESTNUT" stations 1, 2 and 3; NEOSHO to vicinity 23-15N 73W with responsibilities for stations 4, 5 and the Hunter Killer Group, and KASKASKIA to vicinity 26-10N 76-10W for stations 6 and 7. Station oilers continued as gathering points

for incoming and outgoing mail, freight and passenger terminals for their assigned stations.

As operations progressed it became evident that an overall logistic support organization was needed. COMSERVLANT promulgated his operation order 74-62 by message on 30 October. This operation order provided for logistic support, including mobile logistic support, salvage, towing, repair, harbor clearance and such other logistic services as required.

COMSERVRON TWO became CTG 48.1 as well as 136.3 and was given the task of Fleet logistic support generally north of Cuba and Puerto Rico to the 33rd parallel, to TF 136, TG 83.2, TG 44.3 and units of TF 135 operating in his area. COMSERVRON FOUR put on an additional hat as 48.2 and was given the logistic support responsibility in the southern area to include TF 135 and the PACFLT Forces operating in that sector. COMSERVRON EIGHT, Captain N. C. NASH, was designated CTG 48.4 to provide towing, salvage, harbor clearances and other services as required.

COMSERVLANT became CTG 48.6 providing AF and AKS support in the area of operations. As CTG 48.7 RADM Denys W. KNOLL was to provide underway replenishment for LANTFLT Forces north of 33 North.

On 30 October, ships of TF 136 were fueled on, or enroute to their new station assignments. Mail, freight and personnel responsibilities were confirmed as belonging to CTG 136.3, utilizing San Juan as logistic terminal and assigned DD's as delivering units. The DD "Pony Express" utilizing KEITH and WEEKS was initiated.

Also on 30 October, rendezvous between ELOKOMIN and TAO PIONEER VALLEY was effected, but only limited fuel was transferred due to early termination after casualty to two couplings and 1 rig. PIONEER VALLEY was directed to rendezvous with NEOSHO vicinity 23-15N 72W.

The USS OXFORD (AG-159) departed Port Everglades, Florida on 30 October to resume operations off the coast of Cuba, in the Havana area. Due to the nature of OXFORD's operations, the USS PEREGRINE (EMSF-373) was assigned to COMSERVLANT the same date to provide escort duty for OXFORD.

USS TUTUILA (ARG-4) was deployed to Morehead City, N. C. for eight days to provide repair support to a PHIBRON and then further deployed to Vieques and Roosevelt Roads area to provide repair support to AMPHIBIOUS ships in that area.

COMSERVLANT commenced studying the adequacy of the Mayport/Jacksonville area to serve as modified Mobile Logistic Support base. The destroyer tender, USS YELLOWSTONE, already in Mayport, would supply DD types with a broad range of support. Plans called for USS ALTAIR (AKS-32) to operate out of Mayport. Availability and accessibility of land transportation would permit Naval Supply Center Norfolk to act as backup for Mayport. Planning was underway to acquire capability to load out completely a standard AF load. Other facets under study were stocks, storage, transportation, military personnel allowances, and funds.

COMSERVLANT promulgated an emergency loading-out plan providing for the organization and tasks for loading out in support of amphibious operations.

The U. S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay receives its fresh water from a supply administered and controlled by Cuban nationals outside the confines of the base. When the quarantine was imposed, many previously prepared plans took the form of orders and actions in anticipation of Cuban actions which would restrict, secure or otherwise affect the fresh water supply.

USNS MISSION SANTA YNEZ arrived in Norfolk and was assigned an availability for tank cleaning and fresh water loading. USNS COSSATOT arrived in Jacksonville and received the same orders.

As of 27 October, 35,926 men (excluding Marines) were being supported through COMSERVLANT AF resupply. The estimated daily usage rate of NSFO was 42,000 bbls. This average was expected to increase approximately 5000 bbls upon arrival of the Pacific forces.

Service Force units engaged in Cuban quarantine operations were situated as follows:

1. CTG 135.3 (COMSERVRON FOUR) in flagship TRUCKEE constituted the southern URG with SABINE and MAZAMA operating in the vicinity of 17-30N 75-12W, and WRANGELL in the vicinity of 17-20N 73-20W.
2. CTG 136.3 (COMSERVRON TWO) constituted northern URG in flagship NEOSHO, along with CHIKASKIA, KANKAKEE, ELOKOMIN, KASKASKIA, GREAT SITKIN and ALDEBARAN all operating in support of forces manning the quarantine line.

The line extended from 20N to 27-30N and was divided into three equal sectors. ELOKOMIN and CHIKASKIA were supporting the southern sector. NEOSHO, KANKAKEE and GREAT SITKIN were positioned in center sector. KASKASKIA was in the northern sector. ALDEBARAN had just returned from replenishing TG 83.2 and was currently in northern sector.

The successful use of TAO PIONEER VALLEY by NEOSHO on 31 October and 1 November and by KASKASKIA on 2 November demonstrated the utility of TAOs for resupply under certain situations. Three men from NEOSHO were transferred by whale boat to PIONEER VALLEY to assist in the initial hook-up and to facilitate intra-ship communication. Once hook-up was completed, resupply proceeded without difficulty. The earlier difficulty encountered by ELOKOMIN is considered to have been caused by inexperience in the area of rigging for fuelings at sea on the part of TAO personnel. Future resupply by the TAO HENRY proved equally satisfactory. Pumping rates maintained by the TAO were approximately 6 MBBL/HR.

The use of TAO for resupply as reported above was considered satisfactory under the existing, good weather conditions.

Quantities of NSFO were most adequate for the major portion of the operation. During the period 2-4 November when a total of three hunter killer groups were assigned to TF 136 operations the daily usage began to be a matter of concern. With the departure of two of these groups the matter was alleviated.

Planned replenishment of TF 136 was accomplished by means of AF and AKS. USS DENEROLA (AF-56) was the first AF to reach the area to be followed by USS HYADES (AF-28). To effect a savings in communications CTG 136.3 directed, by means of his OPORDER, that AFs make an automatic issue to all ships of one-half the quantities set forth in the applicable provision tables contained in the current COMSERVLANT provisions ordering procedure instruction. It was planned also that starting with HYADES each AF would carry a limited amount of U. S. dollars for cash replenishment for disbursing officers.

Monday, November 5, ALLAGASH enroute to Norfolk to load for underway replenishment of TG 83.3, MARIAS departed Norfolk to refuel TG 83.2 and PAWCATUCK, carrying a AO deck load resupply for TF 135 AO's, departed for TG 48.2. On 6 November ALLAGASH departed Norfolk for TG 83.3.

Air freight lift capacity to GTMO and ROOS RDS areas was increased so that backlogs at Norfolk were reduced to acceptable levels.

Over 6,000 M/T of surface freight, including project MIGHT material, was loaded in USNS GAMMON (TAK-243) for delivery to NSD, GTMO 5 November 1962. An additional 1,400 M/T of material for the GTMO area was loaded in the SS SIXIOLA. The USS DENEROLA and the USS MARIAS departed Norfolk with 48 M/T and 215 M/T of fleet freight for TF 136 and TG 83.2. Surface freight backlogs at Norfolk remained at acceptable levels.

The problem of lifting personnel to ships deployed in the area of contingency operations became a major one. Most of these ships deployed on extremely short notice which resulted in all their personnel on leave as well as large numbers of those on liberty being left behind. These men reported to RecSta NORVA upon return from liberty and leave in such numbers that RecSta "on board FFT" load rose to over 1600. Getting these men to their ships was complicated by lack of transport space and insufficient information at the RecSta concerning ship locations. To resolve this problem CINCLANTFLT designated COMSERVLANT to coordinate all air and surface transportation to the operating forces for CINCLANTFLT and is modifying OPORD 1-61, Basic Operation Order of the Atlantic Fleet, to incorporate this provision.

FMFLANT resupply requirements were calculated and action was initiated to obtain additional shipping. Four TAKs and one TAOG were determined to be required for the first 15 day resupply block. There was potentially an equal shipping requirement for a second 15 day follow on, plus further cycles of 15 days or 30 days depending on the situation. These requirements were in addition to the initial Marine loading out requirements.

On 9 November, COMSERVLANT announced that he would continue relieving AOs on station approximately every 30 days, and the relieved AO would have a two-week tender availability at San Juan or Norfolk. PECOS would continue as JP-5 backup tanker for southern underway replenishment group and would operate in the vicinity or berth at a Jamaican, Haitian or Dominican Republic port. HENRY and PIONEER VALLEY would continue to shuttle between underway replenishment groups and Caribbean ports as long as such a requirement exists.

After a few weeks of operations it became apparent that neither the two Underway Replenishment Group Commanders nor their AO-143 class flagship could maintain the existing tempo of operations without a periodic relief. These URGs under COMSERVRON TWO and COMSERVRON FOUR were supporting Task Forces 128, 135 and 136 which included approximately 85,000 men in 180 ships spread over a 2100 mile line of operations. In order to maintain the same level of support in the furnishing of food, fuel, ammunition, supplies, mail, movies, fleet freight and personnel lift, URG fuel resupply, material control for other than aviation material and to keep COMSERVLANT informed of usage rates and requirements, it was necessary to form up an additional URG staff for employment in successive relief of the two URG commanders then "on the line". Accordingly, using personnel made available on a TAD basis by the Fleet Commander, Captain W.O. SPEARS, Jr., was designated COMSERVDIV 21 and a small operational staff was assembled and scheduled to sail to the area of operations on 19 November.

USS CANISTEO (AO-99) arrived in Norfolk on 13 November for loading and final checkout as flagship for Captain W.O. SPEARS, Commander Service Division 21. CALOOSAHATCHEE arrived in Norfolk the same day and prepared to get underway for TF 136 on 16 November. The Navy Fuel Supply Office, Washington, D.C., negotiated a contract in the Aruba/Curacao area which would insure the availability of 200,000 MBBLs of JP-5, 100,000 MBBLs of which would be available for pickup on a 48 hour notice.

On 10 November, USS SALAMONIE (AO-26) departed Norfolk to rendezvous with TF 136 as relief for USS CHIKASKIA.

COMSERVLANT announced on 15 November that USNS PECOS would remain in support of TF 135 as long as the current readiness posture was held. PIONEER VALLEY would remain under COMSERVLANT's operational control to shuttle to the URGs as required.

USNS PIONEER VALLEY chopped to MSTIS on 21 November. TRUCKEE was directed to consolidate from USNS PECOS and return PECOS to the operational control of COMSTS not later than 22 November.

GREAT SITKIN provided services to TF 136 forces through 16 November, when NITRO arrived relieving GREAT SITKIN to chop to Task Force 135. In general, GREAT SITKIN and NITRO provided services as freight terminals, and in rearming exercises, as well as transferring ammunition.

Commander Task Force 136 presented requirements for the following ammunition types: White Phosphorus, Illumination, Reduced Charges, MK 61 Mechanical time fuzes and BL&P/BL&T. This ammunition is normally not in the AE load. These requirements were met through special loading of reduced charges aboard the NILERO and consolidation between ships of TF 136.

These ammunition types are available on the Destroyer Tenders and Repair Ship however, Commander Task Force 136 desired to retain those quantities for absolute emergency issue only.

From 31 October through 19 November, with the arrival of all ships on their assigned stations, daily underway refueling schedules were utilized to maintain station ships with at least 70% burnable fuel on board. This was accomplished by CTG 136.3 through the use of 3 oilers on station and with the fourth AO in Mayport for fuel, freight, passenger, and mail pick up, or operating south of Vieques for refueling of TF 128 forces. During this period oilers sought out and delivered their products to the customers and provided the services of fleet general purpose transfer terminals.

The replenishment concept at this point was for the oilers to automatically maintain their station ships at the desired percentage thus reducing communications requirements to a minimum. Further, during this period, TF 136 operations were characterized by frequent changes not only in station assignment, but also of station locations. In support of these operations TG 136.3 oilers operated within the Bahama Island chain, as well as 300 miles to the north of them. This flexibility presented various problems, particularly in the area of mail, freight and personnel as enumerated below.

CTG 136.3 was given the responsibility to coordinate delivery and collection of mail for ships of Task Force 136.

CTG 136.2 established his own system, arranging for delivery of mail for TG 136 via Grand Turk. COD aircraft made deliveries to the CVS for further distribution. Subsequent to this, CTF 136 informed CTG 136.2 that arrangements should have been coordinated with CTG 136.3, however, since arrangements were at the time firm, mail for CTG 136.2 continued to be handled in the above manner.

Mail and air parcel post for other ships of TF 136 were routed to San Juan. Two DDs assigned to CTG 136.3 established a Pony Express, to shuttle the quarantine line, delivery to and collect from the on-station oilers. The AOs were the local post offices for further delivery and collection of mail when ships assigned to line came alongside for fuel.

CTG 136.3 requested all TF 136 mail, less TG 136.2, be forwarded to San Juan for pick up by DD Pony Express.

The amount of mail arriving in San Juan appeared unusually small and was a source of concern. CTG 136.3 requested Commanding Officer, USS VILJAN (AR-5), who was in San Juan, to advise CTG 136.3 of mail delivered to San Juan for TF 136.

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On 19 November, Mayport, Florida was added as a terminal point to the Pony Express run, at request of CTG 136.1 (COMCRUESFLOT 12). In this way mail could be picked up either in Mayport or San Juan. The effectiveness of this change could not be measured as the Quarantine Line was soon dissolved.

Upon joining of TG 44.9 to the Atlantic quarantine forces, 22 ships with 8,000 Navymen and 12,000 Marines were added to the logistic support responsibilities of COMSERVLANT. As of 7 November, AF/AKS support was being furnished for an afloat population of 85,000 men in 183 ships deployed over a 2100 mile front. The average daily fuel consumption rates for TF 135 and TF 136 combined were 45 mbbl NSFO, 3 mbbl JP-5 and 1.5 mbbl AVGAS.

During the second week of quarantine, many ocean tows were initiated. USS ATAKAPA (ATF-149) departed Norfolk on 2 November enroute Morehead City, North Carolina with YD-200 in tow, to raise a Marine Corps 50 ton howitzer which had sunk in 25 feet of water. On 3 November, USS SALINAN (ATF-160) departed New Orleans enroute Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida with Army barge in tow.

On 5 November, commencing the third week of the quarantine, the USS MOSOPELEA (ATF-158) departed Charleston enroute to Fort Lauderdale with Army barge BG-6222 in tow. Upon arriving on 7 November, MOSOPELEA was repositioned in West Palm Beach. On 6 November SHAKORI and SENECA departed Norfolk enroute Port Everglades with an Army Fuel Barge and crane in tow. The SHAKORI was later repositioned in Miami on 13 November, and SENECA continued to Guantanamo Bay on 14 November. The duties of the ATF assigned to Guantanamo Bay included the towing of YC-1031 and 1032 loaded with aggregate for Project Might.

During replenishment of USS HANK by HYADES on 5 November 1962 a man was bumped into the sea from the fantail of the HANK by a net load of provisions. HYADES was replenishing HANK to starboard TRUCKEE to port when this accident occurred. Reactions were prompt and efficient. In less than one minute HANK effected emergency break-away and circled to approach the man in the water. Although a rapid recovery by HANK appeared certain, actual recovery was effected by the Helo from TRUCKEE. Airborne in less than three minutes, the Helo had the man safely aboard TRUCKEE in slightly over four minutes from the time he hit the water. A tragedy was averted by timely and effective action by all concerned. Commander Service Squadron FOUR extended his sincere "well done" and cautioned all hands to heed the lessons to be learned from this incident.

As of 11 November, SMOLANT (Ships' Material Office, U. S. Atlantic Fleet) had expedited 659 emergency requisitions (priority 1-5) from deployed units since 29 October. Requests for SMOLANT assistance were being received at the rate of 29 per day, and this was under communications "minimize".

The USS UTINA (ATF-163) departed Little Creek on 17 November for Charleston to receive YON-255 and 256 for tow to San Juan, and the PAUTE departed Mayport for Charleston to receive YON-253 and YIM-755 for tow to San Juan. Both tows departed 20 November. The same day KIOWA departed Norfolk for San Juan with YON-254 and YFU-1 in tow. On 18 November KIOWA encountered heavy weather and after

SECRET



riding out the storm arrived in Morehead City on 20 November to inspect the tow. The YFUL-1 was found to be completely unseaworthy and was turned over to COMFIVE to be later taken to the New Bern Barbour Boat Works. The KIOWA continued to San Juan with YON-254 in tow on 21 November.

Even though the Caribbean was a scene of much activity, the Inter-American Conference of the Red Cross still scheduled a conference in San Juan. One of the leaders, Dr. Stuart Stanbury, executive head of the Canadian Red Cross, suffered a heart seizure while swimming in his hotel pool.

Shortly after Dr. Stanbury was removed from the water, two Navy Shore Patrolmen, James Bridges of USS VULCAN (AR-5) and Paul Capper of USS GRAND CANYON (AD-28) came by and promptly rendered first aid in the form of mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. This was continued for well over an hour until Dr. Stanbury was pronounced dead at a local hospital.

Although the efforts of these men were too late, they were not unappreciated. In a letter to Commanding Officer, USS VULCAN, Mr. Ramone S. Eaton, Vice President, American National Red Cross, commended the promptness with which James L. BRIDGES, MM2, USN, "...responded to this emergency and for the skill and fortitude he showed in personally continuing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation under very difficult circumstances ..."

Bridges received a letter of appreciation from Commanding Officer, USS VULCAN together with a copy of the letter from Mr. Eaton.

COMSERVLANT requested activation of the Mobile NOACT concept to augment Roosevelt Roads by providing two enlisted transportation specialists for a period of 90 days.

COMSERVLANT also requested BUSANDA to advise all shipping activities to insure that all surface and air parcel post shipments to Fleet units are properly addressed.

CHB ONE remained under the operational control of CG, 2nd MARDIV and was located at Camp Lejeune, N.C. During this period, CHB ONE personnel received extensive training in 30 caliber rifle firing, guerrilla warfare tactics, and Cargo Handling and General Stevedoring operations. Strength of CHB ONE - 179.

On 17 November 1962, forces under Commander Service Squadron FOUR commenced logistic support of TG 128.4, the Pacific Amphibious Group. In addition to the ships which departed COMUSMACV to participate in Exercise PHIBRICLEX 62, the following SERVLANT ships and MSTS TAO's chopped to Commander Service Squadron FOUR and participated in the Cuban Operations:

USS PAWCATUCK (AD-108)

USS HYADES (AF-28)

USS KANKAKEE (AD-39)

USS WRANGELL (AE-12)

USS ALTAIR (AKS-32)

USS GREAT SITKIN (AE-17)

USS RIGEL (AF-58)

USNS PECOS

USNS CHEPACHET

USNS PIONEER VALLEY

USNS HENRY

As of 14 November the total afloat population in all task forces, including troops, being supported by COMSERVLANT was estimated at 100,000 men in 184 ships.

WRANGELL, PAWCATUCK and GREAT SITKIN were assigned to CTG 135.3 from 5-19 November, 8-23 November, and 15-23 November, respectively. These ships carried out all commitments of the heavy replenishment schedule of TF 135 and TG 128.4 in a highly effective manner. All replenishments both day and night, were accomplished without any significant casualties.

In addition to the regular replenishment schedule on 18 November, KANKAKEE and WRANGELL transferred several tons of equipment for two aircraft squadrons, VA-34 and VA-64, which were exchanged between ENTERPRISE and INDEPENDENCE.

COMSERVDIV 21 embarked in CANISTEO departed Norfolk on 19 November to relieve COMSERVRON TWO in NEOSHO. NEOSHO was scheduled to return to Norfolk for tender availability.

On 21 November, President Kennedy announced that the quarantine had been susper and that many of the ships in the quarantine forces would be returning soon. Many of the reservists and active duty personnel who were extended were to be released.

As a result COMSERVDIV 21 aboard CANISTEO was directed to rendezvous with SALAMONIE, transfer, and return to Norfolk. CANISTEO proceeded to GTMO for refresher training. On 27 November COMSERVLANT disestablished COMSERVDIV 21 at Norfolk.

Even with President Kennedy's speech lifting the quarantine, SERVRON EIGHT's ships continued to operate for the Cuban Quarantine Operation. On 25 November the USS OPPORTUNE (ARS-41) was sent to Mayport as salvage ship to replace the WINDLASS which had been sent to Charleston.

At 240906Z November, at Latitude 24-17N Longitude 71-48W, in 2900 fathoms of water, the YON-253 towed by PAIUTE sank. The PAIUTE continued on to San Juan with YTM-755 in tow.

After an upkeep period, the OXFORD and PEREGRINE departed Key West for their assigned operation area and arrived on station 27 November. On 28 November PEREGRINE was reverted to the operational control of COMINLANT.

Toward the latter part of the quarantine, the USS W.C. LAWE (DD-763) went aground entering San Juan harbor and on 27 November the KIOWA departed San Juan for Mayport with LAWE in tow, arriving in Mayport on 6 December.

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On 23 November, MAZAMA entered Kingston, Jamaica for liberty and upkeep. She departed Kingston early morning on 25 November to rejoin TG 135.3 and participated in routine replenishments of TG 135.2.

During the period 24 November through 5 December 1962, COMSERVRON FOUR continued to operate as CTG 135.3 in support of TF 135 and TG 128.4.

On 24 November, TRUCKEE anchored outside Kingston Harbor, Jamaica in order to helo COMSERVRON FOUR and staff members to USS HENRICO for a conference with COMPHIBRON ONE (CTU 128.4.8). TRUCKEE departed from anchorage off Kingston the same day and rendezvoused 25 November with KANKAKEE and GREAT SITKIN for mail and personnel transfers. She then proceeded to Guantanamo Bay, arriving afternoon of 25 November, to commence a 5 day TAV.

KANKAKEE anchored Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 24 November for liberty and upkeep. She departed 26 November to rejoin TG 135.3. Enroute, KANKAKEE suffered a material casualty to her economizer tubes. She was ordered to proceed to Kingston to effect repairs with assistance from USS YOSEMITE and to replenish water and lift fleet freight. She arrived Kingston 27 November and departed 29 November to rendezvous with and replenish TG 135.3 on 30 November.

The URG ships went to sea with many of their ship's company new and inexperienced. They are now welded into well trained efficient teams whose actions receive frequent praise from "customer" ships. This evolution from partly inexperienced to highly proficient crews once again demonstrates the irreplaceable value of personnel assignment stability.

On 30 November, MAZAMA was detached and directed to proceed to her homeport, Mayport, Florida.

On 1 December, TRUCKEE departed Guantanamo Bay for rendezvous with TG 135.2 on 2 December. She refueled this task group, transferred freight, and then proceeded to Ocho Rios, Jamaica to transfer personnel to GREAT SITKIN. Transfer was made by small boat during the late afternoon of 2 December and since no suitable anchorage was available, TRUCKEE stood out to sea on completion of this transfer.

On 3 December, TRUCKEE proceeded through the Windward and Crooked Island passages for rendezvous with TG 135.2 for replenishing. Upon completion, CTG 135.3 and TRUCKEE were detached and directed to proceed to Norfolk and rendezvous with ALLAGASH enroute to effect turnover of CTG 135.3. Rendezvous was effected and turnover completed during the evening of 5 December. TRUCKEE with COMSERVRON FOUR and staff embarked then proceeded to Norfolk, arriving 6 December 1962.

PAWCATUCK arrived at Kingston, Jamaica 2 December and remained until morning of 4 December when she refueled units of TF 135 and then proceeded Norfolk.

On 1 December, KANKAKEE arrived Guantanamo Bay to offload NSFO and pick up items of ship's equipment. She then chopped to normal OPCON and proceeded to her homeport, Newport, ETA 6 December.

On 1 December, GREAT SITKIN arrived Ocho Rios for liberty and upkeep. She departed on 3 December for Guantanamo Bay, arriving during the afternoon of the same day. She took on provisions, fuel, and ammunition, and on 5 December, proceeded to holding area to await arrival of TG 135.1.

Some Highlights of Operations:

During one day, the assigned helo transferred 151 men, 39 of them by hoist.

On 27 October 1962, USS TRUCKEE transferred 165 personnel by highline to USS ENTERPRISE.

On 12-13 November, USS TRUCKEE transferred 93 L/T of fleet freight to ships of TF 135, varying from electronic tubes to jet aircraft engines.

Outstanding performance of RIGEL during underway replenishments on 15 and 16 November received plaudits from both INDEPENDENCE and ENTERPRISE.

In one 24 hour period, TRUCKEE fueled and consolidated a total of 23 hours.

On 22 November 1962, TRUCKEE received and delivered 716 bags of mail.

In spite of the past commissioning frustrations and material difficulties experienced by USS KANKAKEE, a newly activated AO, she steamed continuously from 24 October to 5 December and met all commitments expeditiously. Her abilities to accomplish this in the face of the difficulties encountered is a most favorable reflection on the ingenuity and willingness of a hard working crew.

After joining COMSERVRON FOUR on 15 October, USS MAZAMA steamed continuously until 3 December meeting all commitments without incident. In addition to the routine replenishment operations MAZAMA made one trip to Roosevelt Roads to pick up ordnance items to fill up her CLOUD stocks which were urgently required for Marine Corps back up. During this few hours in Roosevelt Roads, MAZAMA personnel accomplished a task that normally would have required two days. There was no liberty or respite from her heavy work schedule and this short period is not considered of sufficient duration to break her continuous steaming record.

Service Force Units transferred 1024 personnel by Helicopter or Highline.

Six Hundred Forty-Eight (648) ships were refueled by Fleet Oilers.

Summary of Service Force Units Participating:

TRUCKEE (AO-147)  
SABINE (AO-25)  
KANKAKEE (AO-39)  
PAWCATUCK (AO-108)  
NEOSHO (AO-143)  
ELOKOMIN (AO-55)  
KASKASKIA (AO-27)  
CHIKASKIA (AO-54)  
SALAMONIE (AO-26)  
MARIAS (AO-57)  
AUCILLA (AO-56)  
CALOOSAHATCHEE (AO-98)  
CANISTEO (AO-99)  
ALLAGASH (AO-97)  
NESPELEN (AOG-55)  
ALDEBARAN (AF-10)  
DENEbola (AF-56)  
HYADES (AF-28)  
RIGEL (AF-58)  
ALTAIR (AKS-32)  
MOBILE ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL UNIT's -  
2 - 4 - 8 - 10 - 12

ARCTURUS (AF-32)  
MAZAMA (AE-9)  
GREAT SITKIN (AE-17)  
WRANGELL (AE-12)  
NITRO (AE-23)  
VULCAN (AR-5)  
TUTUILA (ARG-4)  
OXFORD (AG-159)  
WINDLASS (ARSD-4)  
SENECA (ATF-91)  
SHAKORI (ATF-162)  
MOSOPELEA (ATF-158)  
SALINAN (ATF-161)  
PAPAGO (ATF-160)  
KIOWA (ATF-62)  
UTINA (ATF-163)  
PAIUTE (ATF-159)  
LUISENO (ATF-156)  
MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION's 4-6-7  
CARGO HANDLING BATTALION ONE  
MOBILE ORDNANCE SERVICE UNIT - 4  
MAUNA LOA (AE-8)

ANNEX A

MAINTENANCE

GENERAL:

On Monday, 22 October 1962 when the President announced the intended U.S. Quarantine of Cuba, COMSERVLANT ships undergoing regular overhaul, Restricted/Technical and tender availability were as follows

USS CANISTEO (AO-99)	USS NANTAHALA (AO-60)
USS RECOVERY (ARS-43)	USS SALVAGER (ARSD-3)
USS KIOWA (ATF-72)	USS AEOLUS (ARC-3)
USS PAWCATUCK (AO-108)	USS NITRO (AE-23)
USS ALLAGASH (AO-97)	USS OPPORTUNE (ARS-41)
USS MATTABESSET (AOG-52)	USS THOR (ARC-4)
USS LUISENO (ATF-156)	USS SOMERSWORTH (EPCER-849)
USS AMPHION (AR-13)	

Immediate steps were taken to accelerate completion of work on the above ships. This resulted in all of the above ships being returned to the line prior to the cessation of Cuban operations with exception of NANTAHALA, SALVAGER and SOMERSWORTH. A Code 40 watch was established to insure that a maintenance representative was in the Headquarters around the clock. Six Code 40 officers were members of the war room team. It became evident that increased staffing of officer personnel in Code 40 would be necessary in the event that operations such as the Cuban operations are extended over a long period of time. Fortunately, only four AOs and one AE were off the line undergoing overhaul/restricted availability and tender availability at the onset of the Cuban operations. Higher authority issued instructions to defer some planned overhauls and also cancelled INSUR inspections. Consequently, a large portion of the maintenance effort was to maintain those SERVLANT ships supporting the Cuban operations in the best material condition possible.

Shortage of restricted and technical availability funds in naval shipyards resulted in practically all requests for industrial assistance being allocated in INDMANs. To divert some of this work to naval shipyards would have required a transfer or reprogramming of funds at higher authority.

ANNEX A (CONT'D)CASREPS:

Considering the age of SERVLANT ships it was anticipated that a large number of CASREPS would be forthcoming. Instead of the large volume expected the entire operation was noted for its paucity of CASREPS. Contributing factors that probably militated submitting CASREPS were minimize in effect and the reluctance of Commanding Officers to file CASREPS on equipment that did not render the ship incapable of carrying out its mission.

Due to 32% reduction in funds granted to COMSERVLANT for Fiscal Year 1963 in S&E deficiencies at supply overhaul have not been funded. It is anticipated that SERVLANT ships have been eating into their ship board inventory prior to the Cuban operations and that the use of on board spares was greatly accelerated during the Cuban operations. Cost incurred by SERVLANT ships in support of the Cuban operations were:

Supply and Equippage	\$157,041
Cost of Fuel Consumed by SERVLANT Ships	\$453,940
Restricted and Technical Availabilities	\$132,900
COMSERVLANT Staff Cost	\$6,388
Total	\$750,269

Current plans required COMSERVLANT to support the GTMO water supply by ship during emergency situations. A request to COMSTS for two TAOs for this purpose resulted in the chopping of USNS SANTA YNEZ and USNS COSSATOT to COMSERVLANT. The SANTA YNEZ was ordered into NORVA to clean tanks and fill with fresh water. The COSSATOT was ordered into Jacksonville for the same purpose. Upon completion of loading SANTA YNEZ, and approximately eight hours before getting underway, the ship radio officer quit and walked off the ship. The master would not sail without a radio officer. Finally a radio operator was located in Memphis, Tennessee. A phone call to the Naval Air Station, Memphis resulted in a special Navy flight to fly the radio officer to NORVA. The man arrived and reported on board. The SANTA YNEZ sailed approximately eight hours later.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A (CONT'D)

AR DEPLOYMENT:

As forces continued to build up in the Caribbean area COMSERVLANT recognized the possibility of the repair capability at GTMO being impaired and agreed to a COMPHIBLANT proposal to establish repair facilities in the Caribbean area. USS VULCAN (AR-5) was deployed to San Juan, Puerto Rico with detachments of METU and MOSU units aboard. USS TUTUILA (ARG-4) was deployed to Morehead City, N.C. for eight days to provide repair support to a PHIBRON and then further deployed to Vieques and Roosevelt Roads area to provide repair support to amphibious ships in that area. As Norfolk was used as the main loading out port for AF, AKS and AE type ships, maximum use of the remaining ARs was derived in accomplishing emergency repairs on these turn-around ships.

Work load on VULCAN and TUTUILA in the San Juan, Roosevelt Roads area was spotty, with only a portion of the entire repair force being fully employed.

The main reason for this spotty work load was the short time in port of the ships coming off the Quarantine line. The biggest work load was experienced in repair of teletype equipment. At the start of the Cuban operations SERVLANT ships had reported that required equipment was on board for the capability to convert TTY page printers to 100 WPM operation. Inasmuch as the accomplishment of the conversion was tied directly to the installation of TSEC/DWR-37s, not all SERVLANT ships had affected the conversion. As the conversions were accomplished, a demand for TTY spare parts increased at a rapid rate. A critical shortage of teletype repairmen existed in the fleet and especially on repair ships. In an effort to maintain TTY communications for ships on the quarantine line, TTY replacement pools were established on VULCAN and TUTUILA. This provided replacement units for those machines which could not be immediately repaired due to shortage of repair parts and qualified TTY repairmen. To alleviate the critical shortage of TTY repairmen and general shortage of electronic personnel, METU and MOSU units consisting mostly of Navy civilian engineers were embarked and deployed with VULCAN and TUTUILA.

One unit was utilized on TUTUILA at Morehead City in support of the PHIBRON from 2-11 November and in the Caribbean until 8 December



ANNEX A (CONT'D)

A large unit was deployed on VULCAN from 29 October to 1 December and two man units to the YOSEMITE, COMSERVRON FOUR and to Key West.

COMSERVRON FOUR requested three METU engineers to be assigned to his flagship to act as floaters in support to Task Force 135. This request was not granted at the time. It was felt that better utilization could be made by retaining METU engineers on tenders and repair ships and transferring by COD flight as necessary.

TAO COMMUNICATIONS

At sea consolidation of AO by MSTs TAO requires that voice communication be made available. The uncertainty of the MSTs ships to be assigned in an emergency together with its usually remote location makes it necessary for COMSERVLANT to provide portable equipment for transfer at the scene.

At the onset of the Cuban operation, 6 sets of SCR-624 VHF equipments were borrowed from COMEASTSEAFRON war mobilization pool. Two of these were for SERVLANT AO that did not have equipment installed.

JP-4 REFUELING

A request from COMNAVAIRLANT to provide underway refueling of USS ANTIETAM with JP-4 was a new development as COMSERVLANT oilers do not carry JP-4 nor did SERVLANT have any past experience in handling and transferring JP-4.

The USS NESPELEN was ordered to off-load her standard AOG load, proceed to Norfolk Naval Shipyard for tank cleaning and installation of special underway refueling station.

NESPELEN was loaded with JP-4 at Yorktown without incident and proceeded to rendezvous with ANTIETAM for the transfer of JP-4. Actual underway fueling hoses were passed and hooked up, however, no JP-4 was transferred as the requirement to supply ANTIETAM was no longer necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A (CONT'D)

The defense conditions in effect along the entire East Coast and in the Caribbean area required most ships to be on 4 hours steaming notice. This prevented many SERVLANT ships from complying with BUSHIPS Manual for the cleaning and maintenance of boilers.

Generally speaking, engineering departments in SERVLANT ships displayed ingenuity, devotion to duty, and a sincere sense of engineering responsibility in maintaining their engineering plants in a state of readiness justified by the Cuban operations.

ANNEX BFLEET FREIGHT, PASSENGERS AND MAIL22 to 28 October

**FLEET FREIGHT:** The departure of ships from home ports resulted in the generation of substantial air and surface freight backlogs. Immediate action was taken to obtain an increased air lift capacity. Due to the unavailability of AK type ships it was planned to maximize use of organic ships, AF, AO and the AKS, to lift fleet freight to task force units. Plans were also made to supplement this organic lift capacity by using scheduled commercial space to haul fleet freight to NAVSTA, GTMO and NAVSTA, San Juan.

**PASSENGERS AND MAIL:** The delivery of mail and personnel to the quarantine forces presented numerous problems. The most difficult ones being the location of units in the area and an ultimate means of delivery. Task Force 136 mail and personnel were being routed to Mayport and San Juan. Task Force 135 mail and personnel were sent to GTMO. A backlog in personnel was beginning to develop at the receiving stations. The movement of Task Force units before mail and passengers could reach them was creating problems for the delivery ships. Maximum use of organic shipping was made to reduce the backlog and expedite the movement of both mail and passengers.

29 October to 4 November

**FLEET FREIGHT:** Increased air lift capacity began to reduce air freight backlogs rapidly. All Project MIGHT material located at Norfolk was loaded on SS SIXIOLA which sailed for GTMO on 31 October. The USS DENEbola and USS MARIAS sailed with 263 M/T of freight FFT task force units. TF 44 material was being delivered by truck to ports located in the vicinity where these units were operating.

**PASSENGER AND MAIL:** By 29 October the problem of lifting personnel to ships deployed in the area of contingency operations became a major one. The majority of these ships deployed on extremely short notice which resulted in all their personnel on leave, as well as large number of those on liberty, being left behind upon sailing. These men reported to RECSTA NORVA upon return from liberty and leave in such numbers that RECSTA "on board FFT" load rose to over 1600 by 4 November. The problem of getting these men to their ships was complicated by the lack of transport space along with the lack of information, on the part of the RECSTA, as to just where the ships were. When transportation to the various task groups was available, the RECSTA had no way of knowing to which ships they should send personnel.

On 30 November, CTF 136 designated CTG 136.3 as coordinator for the delivery of mail and passengers to CTF 136 units at sea.

CHIKASKIA, in Mayport, was directed to load all possible mail and

ANNEX B (CONT'D)

personnel from TF 136 and to delay sailing if necessary in order to get the mail aboard.

KEITH was sent to San Juan to pick up mail and personnel and deliver them up the line.

Mail and passengers for TF 135 were being delivered by COD as well as surface lift from GTMO.

5 to 11 November

**FLEET FREIGHT:** During this period air freight movement from Norfolk to GTMO/ROOS RDS continued at a highly satisfactory rate. RIGEL, YOSEMITE, and SALAMONIE departed Norfolk with 170 M/T fleet freight FFT task force units. Additionally, over 6000 M/T of surface freight, including Project MIGHT material was shipped to GTMO from Norfolk on the USNS GAMMON (TAK-243) and 1400 M/T on the SS SIXIOLA.

**PASSENGERS AND MAIL:** To resolve the problem of moving personnel from the RECSTA to the units at sea, CINCLANTFLT, by his 072140Z, designated COMSERVIANT to coordinate for CINCLANTFLT all air and surface transportation to the operating forces.

CINCLANTFLT 091700Z relayed further guidance and procedures relative to transportation of material and passengers and stated intentions of incorporating the provisions of that message in the next changes to CINCLANTFLT OPOD 1-61, Annex F, paragraph 5 and Article 2504 LANTFLT Regulations.

CTG 136.3 was making good use of the DD's to move mail, fleet freight, and passengers from San Juan to units of the quarantine line. Ship departing from the line before transfer could be affected still presented a problem. The VULCAN arrived in San Juan 3 November. VULCAN personnel, upon arrival, immediately began working closely with the base post office personnel with the approval of the Base Commander. VULCAN assisted by providing working parties to sort and process the mail, and by keeping the postal personnel advised of latest ship movements.

Several postal problems existed which complicated matters and tended to make mail service erratic. There existed a lack of up-to-date information as to where ships were located. Dispatch traffic advisories were two and three days late even though classified "operational immediate". Even the Operations Center at COMTEN admitted it could not give up-to-date pictures of ship locations. Secondly, there seemed to be no regular means of getting the mail out to the ships from San Juan. Therefore, it was sent on a catch as catch can basis on any ship heading out toward one task force or another. When such ships were diverted, or the recipient ships were sent elsewhere, the mail delivery was slowed further.

## ANNEX B (CONT'D)

Shortly after VULCAN arrived, COMSERVRON TWO with TF 136 approval, established a shuttle service into San Juan using two DD's to pick up mail from the quarantine line and bring mail out to those ships from San Juan. In addition, he also kept the San Juan Naval Station and VULCAN well informed of what ships were on the line. This system kept TF 136 mail and freight from piling up in San Juan. Freight and passengers going South to TF 135 ships, in contrast, piled up at San Juan for about a week after VULCAN's arrival, until BEARSS, heading for Guantanamo, cleared up the backlog. In time, TF 135 was serviced out of Guantanamo; after that, little mail arrived at San Juan for TF 135.

To determine ships locations and movements VULCAN had to screen all TR and NR broadcasts. Though VULCAN was guarding the TR broadcast, it became apparent that this service was not too reliable. It was necessary to "eavesdrop" on the NR broadcast whenever reception conditions permitted in order to obtain a fuller picture. Between the two broadcasts, the ship was able to keep up a fairly good picture of the movements in TF 135, 136, 128, and 48 so that the mail could be kept moving.

### 12 to 18 November

**FLEET FREIGHT:** Air and surface freight movement continued at satisfactory rates while backlogs remained at acceptable levels.

**PASSENGER AND MAIL:** Through close liaison with all concerned, personnel awaiting transportation at RECSTA NORVA were loaded out as ships and aircraft departed for the area of operations and the backlog was reduced to less than 200 by 17 November. No backlog was apparent at other points on the East Coast.

Mail continued to move from CONUS at a satisfactory rate. The problem of location of units within the Task Forces still existed but was being overcome through the efforts of the VULCAN in San Juan. During this period, mail for the PACFLT units began to arrive in small quantities. Some units were left out of the mail routing from the West Coast.

### 19 to 25 November

**FLEET FREIGHT:** Air lift service to GTMO/ROOS RDS continued to be exceptionally good. Surface freight movements to GTMO, ROOS RDS, KINGSTON and TRINIDAD were scheduled for commercial bottoms on the SS TRANSCARIBBEAN, SS JUNIOR and the SS MORNACDOVE. Backlogs of both air and surface freight at Norfolk were minimal.

**PASSENGERS AND MAIL:** Mayport, Florida was added as a terminal point to the Pony Express run operated by CTG 136.3. In this way, mail and passengers could be picked up either in San Juan or Mayport. The effectiveness of this change could not be measured as the quarantine line was disestablished shortly thereafter.

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ANNEX B (CONT'D)

26 November to 2 December

**FLEET FREIGHT:** Prior to the cancellation of the Cuban Operation, both air and surface freight on hand in the Norfolk area remained at negligible levels. Upon cancellation of the Cuban Operation, immediate action was taken to hold freight at the homeports of returning units and steps were taken to return material in transit.

**PASSENGERS AND MAIL:** The disestablishment of the quarantine line and the resulting movements of units caused a disruption in the mail and passenger flow. Mail enroute to GTMO and San Juan had to be sorted and rerouted to the destination of the individual units. Some delay in the receipt of mail was necessary. However, most of it was awaiting the ships upon their arrival at homeports.

PROVISIONS AND STORES22 to 28 October

AF: Upon initiation of the quarantine, the loading of USS ALSTEDE (AF-48) and USS DENEbola (AF-56) was accelerated. COMSERVLANT announced plans on 25 October to provide provisions to the quarantine forces by cycling an AF through positions convenient to deployed elements on a monthly basis. The amphibious forces scattered along the Carolina, Georgia and Florida coasts would also be replenished without deleterious effects on Mediterranean AF deployments.

AKS: On 22 October USS ALTAIR (AKS-32) commenced topping-off with fleet issue load to support the quarantine forces. ALTAIR has recently returned from the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean after spending 30 months away from the U.S. ALTAIR returned for a shipyard overhaul to commence in December. COMSERVLANT requested that the overhaul be postponed. Current plans called for ALTAIR to depart Norfolk for Mayport, Florida on 29 October and to depart Mayport on 10 November to replenish TF 135, TF 136 and TF 44 in that order then return to Mayport. This schedule was anticipated on a monthly cycle.

These ships were sailed by COMSERVLANT in TG 48.6 to engage in replenishment as coordinated by CTG 135.3 and CTG 136.3 in support of their respective task force. AF and AKS services were also offered to CTF 128.

29 October to 4 November

Fleet provisions and stores were scheduled for replenishment by USS HYADES (AF-28), USS DENEbola (AF-56) and USS ALTAIR (AKS-32). All departed fully loaded in anticipation of extra-heavy demands in the operating area. HYADES and DENEbola were scheduled to return to Norfolk after replenishment cycle every 30 days. All units concerned were directed to review helicopter operation bills since ALTAIR would employ the vertical replenishment method.

5 to 11 November

AF: RIGEL departed Norfolk on 7 November to rendezvous with TG 83.2 on 10 November. COMSERVLANT's policy statement issued on 9 November

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**ANNEX C (CONT'D)**

announced that a freshly loaded AF would be made available to CTG 48.1 and another to CTG 48.2 approximately every 20 days.

**AKS:** ALTAIR departed Mayport on 10 November for a replenishment run through the Task Forces.

**12 to 18 November**

As of 14 November three AFs had transferred the following amounts of provisions:

HYADES: 548 L/Tons to 19 ships  
RIGEL: 138 L/Tons to 4 ships  
DENEbola: 212 L/Tons to 18 ships

**19 to 25 November**

COMSERVLANT requested the disestablishment of the RPMIO on ALTAIR due to the suspension of the Cuban Quarantine.

On 21 November HYADES' sailing from Norfolk was cancelled.

As of 26 November, ARCTURUS was scheduled to depart Norfolk on 30 November to replenish TF 135, TG 128.4 and TG 83.3 which were still in the Caribbean area.

**26 to 30 November**

**AF:** Cancellation of the quarantine operation; the detachment of TG 128.4 and the orders which indicated rotation of TF 135 units negated the need for ARCTURUS sailing which therefore was cancelled.

**AKS:** When TF 136 was dissolved, no need remained for ALTAIR. Therefore, ALTAIR was ordered to return to Norfolk to prepare for a long overdue yard overhaul.



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ANNEX D

COMMUNICATIONS

HEADQUARTERS:

On Friday, 19 October, the communication workload in the classified section began to increase slightly, then rapidly, beginning with the week of 22 October. After about a week, the plateau was reached and the number of classified messages handled daily remained high for the remainder of the Cuban crisis. The amount of unclassified traffic began to decrease due to MINIMIZE and it was necessary to classify messages of a logistic nature and movement reports which would normally have been unclassified.

The overall traffic load for November totaled 10,823 messages, approximately 900 less than September when Exercise High Heels was conducted. The traffic load for August, the last complete month of normal operations, was 10,962 messages. The breakdown of classified and unclassified messages for these three months follow:

	<u>August</u>		<u>September</u> (High Heels)		<u>November</u>	
	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>
Unclassified	6,862	2,141	6,225	1,669	4,831	1,003
Classified	1,531	428	2,874	944	3,927	1,062
TOTALS	8,393	3,569	9,099	2,613	8,758	2,065
Grand Totals	10,962		11,712		10,823	

It can be readily seen that the total number of messages handled during August and November varied little; however, the classified load was two and one-half times greater during November. Many of the classified messages were lengthy, of a high precedence and classified Secret/Top Secret. This served to increase the overall workload of the communication center and increased the tempo of operation within the center. The increase in classified traffic, while the overall count remained stable, trebled the overall workload.

During November, the communication center had seven officers and twenty-six enlisted personnel assigned. Of these, three enlisted were on TAD to CINCLANTFLT. All hands were required to work at least an average of twelve hours each day while the officers averaged even more. The only manner in which communications could expeditiously serve the War Room was to use multiple copy paper in the incoming on-line teletype machine and deliver a copy of each message to the War Room for immediate use pending the processing of the message in the normal manner. After ten days of such hours and tempo of operations, the efficiency of the personnel decreases with a deterrent result in communications. In general, communications does not meet the desired state of readiness due to the shortage in personnel.

Underway Replenishment Group Commanders:

The quarantine operation commenced on such short notice that virtually all of the operational planning had to be conducted while forces were being deployed. The rapidity of high level decisions in the early stages necessitated frequent large scale changes, modifications and amplifications to the initial orders. Many ships arrived on the scene minus the basic OpOrders (CTF 136 221640Z and CTG 136.1 231600Z) inasmuch as they were not in the original make-up of the quarantine force. After the quarantine was well underway, COMSERVLANT made up packets of pertinent messages, especially OpOrders and Plans, to hand out to the URG ships departing Norfolk for the operating area. The ships having the basic OpOrders passed them to the less fortunate as location permitted. The principal means for getting to the basic information distributed were the Task Force Commander's Net and the Task Group Commander's Net. Both COMSERVRON TWO and COMSERVRON FOUR used G17D as an URG Net. Some interference from the other was experienced at night due to the close proximity of the forces. Both URG Commanders experienced difficulty in getting messages to their respective ships on the Fleet Broadcasts because of the heavy backlog of high precedence traffic. In addition, the classified messages originated by the URG Commander were off-line encrypted due to the lack of on-line transmitting capabilities. This caused an undue delay in high precedence operational traffic at both the originating and receiving points.

Of the Fleet Broadcasts for the quarantine area, the Norfolk broadcast was the superior. The signal was strong and little difficulty was experienced in copying a full sked. The signal from San Juan was very weak and of little value to the forces as Fleet Broadcast. This is a matter well known in OP 94 inasmuch as unsuccessful attempts have been made to correct the deficiencies at NAVCOMSTA SJUAN. Few ships were able to copy Radio San Juan thus adding to the traffic load at Norfolk. Requests for messages not held and for reruns added to the traffic load for the Norfolk Broadcast. Many of these requests were apparently not screened as evidenced by the original date-time-group. One message in particular, which was rerun on 23 November and had a DTG of 13 November, was a request for a pilot for port entry on 14 November and had a priority precedence. This rerunning of messages long overtaken by events was a needless effort. One ship reports that in screening the broadcast schedule it was noted that approximately 12 percent of the numbers were reruns.

The high frequency equipment in the URG ships, with the exception of the RUC 32, is generally obsolete. The model 28 teletype writers, already in use for years in most cases, experienced casualties when put into constant use copying the 100 WPM broadcasts.

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ANNEX D (CONT'D)

The breakdown of messages handled by the URG Commanders exclusive of those relayed follows:

COMSERVRON TWO

	Incoming	Outgoing
UNCLASSIFIED	1,452	402
CLASSIFIED	952	129

COMSERVRON FOUR

	Incoming	Outgoing
UNCLASSIFIED	2,508	401
CLASSIFIED	331	380

## ANNEX E

MCB OPERATIONS

Feb-Apr 1962

Early in Feb 1962 the need for developing a plan for the construction of heavy fortification for defense of the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was recognized. CINCLANTFLT directed that a team of consultants be provided from FMFLANT and CBLANT to prepare this plan.

On 30 March, a team lead by COL E. M. STIMSON, USMC, arrived at GTMO. Other members of the team were Majors J. J. MEEK and G.J. CIZEK, CAPT C. J. SMITH, USMC and LT D. W. URISH, CEC, USN. LT URISH was provided by COMCBLANT to assist in the preparation of estimates of materials, manpower, and funds required for implementation of the fortification plan.

This team completed its work on 12 April, recommending three alternate types of construction for the defenses. These types were: reinforced concrete at \$435,139, timber at \$327,353 and concrete block at \$279,035. Three lines of defense were recommended by the Marines: called the main line of resistance (MLR); secondary line of resistance (SLR), and the final line of resistance (FLR). The plan devised did not locate the defenses on the ground but was general in nature recommending quantity, design, and types. Only the MLR was sketched on existing maps, the SLR and FLR were merely estimated using the MLR as a basis. The types of defenses suggested were pill boxes, tank revetments, mortar and recoilless rifle revetments, communications and fighting trenches, antitank ditches and minefields. The defense design considered the number of defensive troops assigned and the limited firepower of the Cubans.

May-July 1962

On 2 May 1962 COMCBLANT submitted the support costs of the CEs not included in the above estimates. These ranged from \$233,174 for the reinforced concrete to \$163,634 for the concrete block. CINCLANTFLT chose, as his recommendation to CNO on 16 May, construction using concrete block with earth cover fortifications and metal revetments. Total Cost - \$442,671.

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

In anticipation of early fundings and authorization, CINCLANTFLT requested that funds in the amount of \$85,000 be made available to CINCLANTFLT in order to do preliminary planning and prepositions. In addition, CINCLANTFLT authorized the assignment of Marine liaison officers to locate the defense installations on the ground, thereby waiving necessity for firm design plans and delay. Neither the funds nor the officers were forthcoming.

CNO, on 31 May, advised that the project had been submitted under Section 203, Public law 87-57, emergent military construction for funding. On 11 June, BUDOCKS included 7% increase in cost to the project for administration bringing the total to \$474,000. CNO advised on 12 July, that FY 62 emergent funds were exhausted and that the project was being forwarded recommending approval under FY63 MCON bill yet to be enacted into law. Including committees of Congress, delays were anticipated up to 3 months.

At this point, MCB 4, already in Cuba on other assignments, under the command of CDR J. M. HILL, CEC, USN, was primed and ready to go on the job. Sufficient material was on hand to start upon authorization. However, plans called for MCB 4 to initiate the work with MCB 7 relieving them in Dec 1962. The project was to be completed in the summer of 1963.

Aug-Sept 1962

In early Aug, COMSERVLANT and COMCBLANT were in close contact with GTMO, insuring that procedures were established for procurement of all materials not on hand and establishment of those materials definitely available. However, no plans were available nor was any field work attempted.

On 10 Sep., CINCLANTFLT advised that clearance of all congressional committees had been obtained. A milestone report was received by CINCLANTFLT on 14 Sept. As the world situation grew more tense, more and more emphasis was placed on early completion of the project.

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

CINCLANTFLT wanted to know what actions were required to complete the entire project by 1 Jan 1963; what actions were required to complete the entire project by 1 Mar 1963, and what was the earliest that the project could be completed and the requirements for completions using all available means. We replied in effect that unless wholesale withdrawals from PWMRS and the use of all CBs in the Atlantic was authorized, only the MLR could be completed prior to 1 Jan 1963. From this date, the decision was made to shoot for completion of the MLR by 1 Jan 1963 and the total project by 1 April 1963.

These actions resulted in alerting MCB 7 for deployment to GTMO in advance of their scheduled departure; substantial withdrawals of construction equipment from Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks, and a concerted effort to transport men and equipment to Cuba.

On 20 Sept., CINCLANTFLT stated that funds were available and desired completion of this project at the earliest feasible date. From this point on the word was "go".

MCB 4 started work on the MLR on 24 Sept. CAPT STELGER, Deputy DIRLANTDOCKS, accompanied VADM BEAKLEY to GTMO last week-end, 29-30 Sept. He came back encouraged as to prospects for completion by 30 April. He had been able to see a position almost completed with the block up to the final course. Other positions were already started. MCB 4 has closed out their other projects except for the airfield lighting at Leeward and McCalla; the perimeter road and fence replacement, and the water line projects.

CAPT W. M. HEAMAN, CEC, USN, COMCBLANT, flew to Norfolk on 26 Sept., for a conference with RADM W. C. G. CHURCH, CEC, DIRLANTDOCKS and RADM DENYS KNOLL, COMSERVLANT. The following decisions and actions were taken:

a. Equipment - COMCBLANT compiled a list of required equipment, checked it against availability and forwarded the deficiencies to BUDOCKS who screened PWMRS for location. BUDOCKS obtained CNO

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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

authorization for withdrawal and release to COMCBLANT. All equipment requiring overhaul and repair was turned over to CBC Davisville and that activity was authorized to expend overtime to perform necessary work. To facilitate this, COMSERVLANT requested assignment of a FAD II to the project. This was promptly authorized by CINCLANTFLT. YDSO, HUENEME expedited 6101 packs (spare part assemblies) and authorized maximum assignment of available parts. No withdrawals of equipment from Spain or ROOS RDS were necessary.

b. Personnel - MCB 4 was to be extended at GTMO. MCB 7, originally scheduled to go to GTMO at the end of November was to deploy approximately 28 October. MCB 7 finished military training at Camp Lejeune on 5 October and was returned to Davisville to prepare to assemble equipment and leave on 28 October. In addition, MCB 4 was augmented by personnel available at Davisville, some 66 men. COMNAVAIRLANT arranged to fly them to GTMO on 3 October. These moves were to result in approximately 900 men being at GTMO by 5-10 November.

c. Transportation - COMSERVLANT made HYADES available for lifting cargo to GTMO and scheduled her departure from Norfolk on 6 October and from Davisville on 9 October. All stops were pulled to insure that all available cargo has been put aboard the HYADES at Norfolk. COMCBLANT readied 800 M/T of cargo, including 6 bulldozers, tents, bunks, mattresses, mortar mixers, jack hammers, footlockers, etc., at Davisville for loading on the 8th. COMPHIBLANT was cooperating in furnishing other lifts. The ships to be assigned were still pending but one ship was to load at Davisville approximately 16-19 October (Davisville would have 3500 M/T of cargo ready). The S.S. TRANSUNION was to lift 500 M/T on 22 October. COMPHIBLANT was to provide the LST 1156 on 28 October to lift MCB 7 plus 1400 M/T of cargo. In case the ship scheduled for 16 to 19 October could not carry all of the 3500 M/T available, the THUBAN, on 1-3 November was to lift the cargo remaining. The LST 1156 would bring back - from GTMO and ROOS RDS, all deadlined equipment for major overhaul and subsequent use by MCB 6 on Project JUDY.

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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

d. Material - NSD GTMO had gone all out to stockpile and order materials under NSA. 25,000 concrete blocks were reported already on hand. Requisitions for the other materials were on order. In fact, much material had been placed in the HYADES. The two items which have the longest lead time were corrugated metal and sheet steel. Both of these could be procured well within the construction schedule. Aggregate appeared to be no problem thanks to COM-SERVON EIGHT's ATF tows and the use of local material.

e. Coordination - The Marines sent a team of 4 Officers, led by a LTCOL, to act as technical advisors in the construction of the projects. They were to arrive on the site by 10 October. COMCBLANT had set up a COMCBLANT REP with Staff to direct the two battalions and coordinate their activities. CDR LALANDE, present Commanding Officer of MCB 7, had been nominated. He is scheduled to be relieved as Commanding Officer of MCB 7 in January. Until that time the Executive Officer will act as Commanding Officer.

One of SERVLANT's own ships, the USS HYADES (AF-28) under the command of CAPT G. M. HAGERMAN, USN, steamed into Davisville on 7 October to load initial equipment urgently needed at GTMO. The HYADES departed for GTMO on the evening of the 8th carrying 408 L/T and 1301 M/T mostly consisting of 10 deck loaded bulldozers averaging 28 tons each.

15-21 October

It is well to note at this point that transportation of CBs has long been a difficult problem. COMPHIBLANT encountered many problems in securing transportation for Project MIGHT but had done an outstanding job of juggling shipping schedules.

As of 21 October, MCB 4 had accomplished 13% overall completion on the MLR. Layout of the FLR was well underway and requirements for the SLR were being clarified. Latest estimates indicate that approximately 550 concrete block structures would be required. A



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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

quarter of a million concrete blocks were to be used. The defensive lines cross some of the most rugged terrain features on the Base, and the exact scope of such work as sandbagging, trenches and site restoration would not be finalized until the work was well along. Further, sophisticated improvements, such as trenches, obstacles, tank traps, moats, mine fields, communications and utilities were still in the discussion stage. MCB 4 was working with 481 men on site. CDR LALANDE, the COMCBLANT REP GTMO, and his assistant LCDR SUTLEY arrived with an advance party of 10 men from MCB 7. Arrangements were made at GTMO to receive MCB 7 and its 450 men.

Thus the stage was thereby set for deployment of 900 CBs and transportation of massive amounts of equipment to GTMO when the Cuban crisis broke out.

22-28 October

Planning had been going on for some time, prior to the Cuban Crisis, to improve the readiness of the Naval Construction Forces. However, since July 1962, special emphasis had been given to this planning. In part, this was due to CNO release of 5-P25 functional components. Additional effort was made to bring these P-25s to full strength.

At the time of the crisis the MCBs had the following deployments and contingency plan commitments:

MCB-1	Rota, Spain
MCB-4	GTMO
MCB-6	ROOS RDS
MCB-7	Davisville preparing to go to GTMO
MCB-8	Antarctica
OPLAN 316	Provide 1 MCB for AIR portion. Provide 1 MCB for LAND portion. Use CLOUD material.
OPLAN 201	Submit redeployment plan. Return detachments.
PLAN ALPHA	MCB 6 designated.
OPLAN 315	Provide 6 MCBs in MED area.

## ANNEX E (CONT'D)

On 19 October, Chief of Naval Operations released CLOUD stocks to CG FMFLANT. As a prelude to something greater, it set into motion long thought out plans, those plans that had been exercised so rigorously under HIGH HEELS II just completed in late September.

On 22 October, COMPHIBLANT was issued load-out directions and Defense Condition III was set. This same date, the marines requested designation of the 2- $\frac{1}{2}$ P25 components to support their forces. One CB officer was requested to arrive at FMFLANT HDQTRS by 24 October, for liaison, planning and subsequent assignment to the II MEF Engineer group when activated. LTJG P.J. POCSI, from MCB-4, reported to LCDR W.W. GENTRY, Staff Civil Engineer for FMFLANT. A week later LTJG POCSI was relieved by LTJG R.C. METZNER from MCB-6, the battalion to be designated for FMFLANT use.

In addition, MCB-1 was alerted for possible mount-out by air within 48 hours, on 23 October. They were to carry only weapons, 782 gear, survival gear and minimum administrative records and necessities. MCB-6 was alerted to be prepared to mount-out with all operable or easily repairable equipment within 48 hours.

On the 23rd, MCB-7 was just ready to deploy for GTMO. CINCLANTFLT was advised that the plan ALFA back-up battalion would be changed to MCB-7 vice MCB-6 upon Seven's arrival at GTMO.

Recommendation was made to CINCLANTFLT on 23 October, that MCB-6 and MCB-7 be designated as the 2- $\frac{1}{2}$ P25 components required under the 3.6 plan. This was done with the understanding that if MCB-7 support is implemented, Project MIGHT reduced in priority.

On 24 October, COMCBLANT requested action from BUDOCKS to provide supplementary equipment to the new NATO rifles issued to the CBs. Up until this time, they had not been issued to the individual battalions and now it was desired to do so to make them compatible with the II MEF.

At this time, a serious look at all eventualities was being taken. As a result, the following determinations were made:

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

OPLAN 201 - Annex A requires the submission of a redeployment plan upon the implementation of 201. Current operations make the submission of such a plan somewhat impractical. Of the 5 battalions available, three are tied to current operations. One of the other two is in the Antarctica and the other in Rota. Little change could be recommended prior to developments requiring specific action. Another action requested is to bring deployed detachments back to parent units or Davisville. Only 4 detachments are deployed. DET HOTEL in Bermuda, MTT-4 in Chile, DET LIMA in Haiti, and DET SIERRA on Project NOMAN. Detachments HOTEL and SIERRA are easily handled and both are in the final stages of their assignments. MTT-4 and DET LIMA are both very small units and will require considerable effort to return to Davisville. Unless the situation becomes critical, would recommend that they not be returned to Davisville.

In view of above, transportation requirements would be light until a specific redeployment was required. The CB units are better able to meet any task imposed due to actions taken in improving readiness stature in connection with current operations. However, no unit is carrying tents, camp facilities, P-25 equipment, medical, etc. In case of MCBs 6 and 7, this deficiency is to be met by deploying CLOUD stocks. Most of this equipment is at Davisville. Redeployment of units will require action to marry up gear from Davisville or Rota with battalion in question.

GTMO: The CBs have four commitments at GTMO:

(1) Plan ALPHA CINCLANTFLT OPCODE 14-62: MCB 6 is presently designated as back-up battalion for GTMO. As soon as MCB 7 arrives in GTMO, MCB 6 will be relieved of this responsibility and MCB 7 designated as back-up battalion. When MCB 7 is pulled out to support the Marines AIR commitment in Plan 316, it will leave approximately 170 men behind and attach them to MCB 4. It is assumed that Project MIGHT will be deferred at this time so MCB 4 and these additional men will be sufficient to implement Plan ALFA.

(2) Defense Battalion: Now that the Marines have over 5000 men in GTMO, there is no longer any need for CBs to man front line

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

trenches, thus relieving MCB 4 of this responsibility. If Plan 316 is implemented, the Marines at GTMO make up part of II MEF and the defense lines will not be needed.

(3) Support II MEF: MCB 7 has been designated to support the AIR portion of the 316 plan. MCB 6 has been designated to support the LAND portion of the 316 plan. Both requirements are for approximately 250 men.

(4) Project MIGHT: If plan 316 is implemented, it is assumed Project MIGHT will be deferred.

Roosevelt Roads: The Marines plan to lift MCB 6 out of ROOS RDS approximately 2 November. If this transpires, MCB 6 will leave a small detachment (approximately 20 men) to complete the 4 magazines now under construction and to take care of the battalion equipment and gear remaining.

MCB 6 Support of II MEF: The Marines' lift of MCB 6 from ROOS RDS creates a problem. OP control of MCB 6 is now with CO NAVSTA ROOS RDS. It does not pass to II MEF until Plan 316 is implemented. Under present Marine planning, the II MEF could be prepositioned thus entailing lifting of MCB 6 before OP control passes from CO NAVSTA ROOS RDS. Marines will inform CINCLANTFLT and COMSERVLANT of plans. COMSERVLANT will inform ROOS RDS of change of OP control when requested. COMCBLANT is alerting MCB 6 and ROOS RDS today. After lifting by Marines (via TERREBONNE PARISH), MCB 6 will proceed to operation area, if Plan 316 is implemented or else back to Lejeune to regroup. Both  $\frac{1}{2}$ P25 components from CLOUD stocks will be loaded aboard a TAK at Davisville and will join MCB 6 at the operations area or at Lejeune. Whether MCB 7 uses present equipment or the second  $\frac{1}{2}$ P25 components depends on developments. Big problem: No construction materials are available for CBs or Marine Engineers in support of Plan 316. Both CBs and Marines are trying to determine needs and obtain them now that Marines have funds.

On 26 October FMFLANT advised that MCBs should anticipate employment for repair of airfields, port facilities, roads, bridges and utilities. On E-4 day COMCBLANT was told to prepare to load, at Davisville, equipment and material support for MCBs 6 and 7. FMFLANT listed five classes to be loaded:

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

Class I - 15 days meals combat.

Class II - Alert Equip as best to support mission.

Class III - 5 days MOGAS, Diesel, 15 days lubes and greases.

Class IV - Provide balanced initial supply of construction and repair materials.

Class V - Ammo - allowance plus 15 days supply.

Resupply was to be done by the Marines for all but Class II. On this same day, FMFLANT ordered MCB 6 to chop to them upon execution of 316 Plan and MCB 7 to chop on order.

The first CBUC at Davisville was reported exercised and ready at Davisville on the 26th.

On 22 October, on the eve of President Kennedy's speech, all COMPHIBLANT transportation arrangements were cancelled pending establishment of priorities. Fleet shipping was at a premium and yet 450 CBs and some 975 tons of heavy construction equipment were sitting at Davisville awaiting to be picked up. CINCLANTFLT gave Project MIGHT cargo #2 priority. COMPHIBLANT rescheduled immediate commitment of the LST 1156 TERREBONNE PARISH.

At 1500 on the 24th, LST 1156 docked at Davisville. She sailed at 0600 on the 25th carrying 348 men of MCB 7 and more than 500 tons and 80,000 cubic feet of construction equipment.

Meanwhile back at GTMO, MCB 4 stopped work on Project MIGHT on 22 October. MCB 4 was required to assist in the evacuation of dependents, digging in of the Marines arriving to bolster forces, support cargo handling operations, and direct military combat support during defense exercises. Delays in MIGHT lasted about a week.

On 28 October, the HYADES sailed once again for Davisville to lift more equipment for the CBs, a chore she was used to by now.

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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

29 October - 4 November

COMCBLANT provided FMFLANT with shipping information on CLOUD. General cargo was 1700 L/T, 39 M/T, 14,200 sq ft. and vehicle cargo was 615 L/T, 2600 M/T and 13,300 sq ft.

In order to support the Marines and meet construction requirements, CNO authorized release of MRS, \$236,200 worth of material under symbols KZ, 9C, D, 9Y, Y, and 9G.

On 31 October, MCB 7 was designated as back-up battalion in support of Plan ALFA. This same date, COMCBLANT requested \$375,000 to fund MRS stock issue and repair parts for 3-P25A outfits. P25 deficiencies have been a long problem and will continue to be one. At present, there are 7795 items of deficiency in the 5-P25s released by CNO. This crisis provided just the bare essentials in spare parts to keep going and is a long way from real needs.

On 31 October, FMFLANT requested MCB 6 to be directed to embark aboard the USS TERREBONNE PARISH from ROOS RDS. This was done prior to implementation of the 316 Plan in order to group them with the MEF Engineer Battalion at Camp Lejeune.

By 1 November, the second CBUC at Davisville was reported exercised and ready to load.

On 2 November, MCB 6 movement was approved and on this same date the battalion boarded LST 1156.

The HYADES left Davisville on 30 October for GTMO carrying 120 CBs from MCB 7 and fully loaded with her normal replenishment supplies and topped off with approximately 200 M/T CB equipment.

With arrival of the HYADES on 3 November, the CB count onboard at GTMO was approximately 960 strong.

On 30 October, the SS AFRICAN GLEN loaded the remaining equipment for MIGHT at Davisville and set course for GTMO. 2500 tons, over 400,000 cubic feet and 11,000 M/T consisting of 184 trucks,

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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

39 mixers, 14 cranes, 27 bulldozers, 15 trailers, 7 rollers, 7 graders, 4 busses, and 150 other items of assorted equipment was in GTMO.

In addition to this equipment, at the height of the crisis the SS GAMMON, a commercial ship under charter to MSTs lifted concrete blocks to GTMO from Norfolk to insure back-up supply to keep the CBs working. The CBs themselves were producing over 2,000 blocks per day from raw material. However, they couldn't keep up with the usage rate of 4,000 blocks per day that their mates could place.

5-11 November

MCB 6 arrived in Camp Lejeune on 7 November and reported for training with the new NATO rifles, indoctrination in Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS), and amphibious training.

The situation stayed this way until the Cuban quarantine was lifted on 21 November. MCB 6 was airlifted to Davisville on 30 November to prepare for deployment to Project JUDY. The 2 CBUCS in Davisville were returned to 10 day readiness storage on 5 December 1962.

Project MIGHT was 7% complete by this time but the money situation became a real problem. As the additional Marines came ashore, defense requirements changed with the changing situation. Cuba had gained greater firepower and arms. The old problem of not having a definitive scope or plans that were waived back in May led to higher cost. A request of some \$353,000 was made to permit construction on the revised scope. Urgency was stressed as 900 men were working and had to be kept gainfully employed.

The base fortifications project was based upon providing three hardened structure lines. These lines were to be manned by personnel from the Marine Barracks, the Construction Battalion and naval Personnel from other activities on board. The structures and reinforcements were to be used until reinforcements could arrive. The 1 April scope was developed from the data submitted by Colonel STIMSON on 12 April 1962.

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

On 21 October, the tactical situation changed rapidly and new USMC units began arriving. Reorganization of the ground defense forces was accomplished to take into consideration the additional forces and the increased readiness posture. A re-evaluation of the project was required to consider two distinct possibilities:

(1) That forces on the station prior to the crisis and those augmenting forces would remain for an indefinite period.

(2) That the augmenting forces would be withdrawn and the original forces on board prior to the crisis would remain under defensive conditions upon which the 1 April scope was predicted.

A successful coordination of the requirements for both possibilities was made by realignment of structure types and locations within the three lines. This realignment was accomplished within the scope and actually resulted in a decrease in the total number of hardened and revetted structures (except trenching) required by the original scope. The 9 November scope includes a request for 700 hardened and revetted structures versus 741 hardened and revetted structures in the 1 April scope.

COMNAVBASE GTMO had stated that the construction of the MLR estimated at 6,000 man-days would require approximately 6 months. The construction schedule was compressed when the need for fortifications became critical and the established schedule given to COMCBLANT required completion of the entire project now estimated at 33,000 man-days in 6 months.

This accelerated construction rate resulted in the following:

(1) Assigning two MCBs to GTMO. This necessitated erection of berthing tents, field type showers, emergency storage space, and increased laundry equipment requirements. Additional hand tools for masonry construction and tool kits for automotive maintenance were required to effect construction and repair equipment at an accelerated pace. This increased the requirement for CB Support Funds.



ANNEX E (CONT'D)

(2) Withdrawal of equipment from MRS. This equipment was required to support the accelerated schedule and was not available in the COMCBLANT equipment pool. This equipment must be returned to MRS in a Ready For Issue Condition. The cost of this rehabilitation upon completion of the project has been estimated by COMCBLANT to be \$70,000. This \$70,000 would not have been required under normal construction schedules.

(3) \$56,000 worth of additional equipment was purchased by COMCBLANT because it was not available from MRS but was required for completion of the project in the time allotted.

The cost of sandbagging was not included in the original estimate. Evaluation of the prototype under fire from weapons on board proved the value of sandbagging, but to realize the maximum protection from concrete block, earth covered structures, sandbagging is necessary. Therefore, in subsequent submissions of requests for funds, a line item of 250,000 sandbags costing \$50,000 was included.

The arrival of additional FMF units and the tactical situation, required that those units be supported with equipment and necessary CB construction shop facilities as a military operational necessity. Hasty fortifications were required in the field. These items of support were estimated to be \$4,000 for hasty fortification materials and \$10,000 for equipment and shop support.

The material costs per structure increased upon firm material requirements and procurement costs.

The evaluation of the prototype hardened structure indicated that the original gunport subjected the machine gunner to ricocheting bullets. The gunport was redesigned to minimize the effect of ricochets. The redesign was accomplished and tested satisfactorily. 490 apertures are required. The increased cost of the new aperture does not exceed \$10 per aperture or an approximate total of \$5,000 increased cost to the total project.

Based upon the reorganization of the ground defense, the three lines were redesignated as the Main Line of Resistance (MLR), Secondary Defense Line (SDL), and the Final Defense Line (FDL).

ANNEX E (CONT'D)

The requirement for trenching increased, and the cost per unit of trench also increased. A re-evaluation of the need for trenching in view of the current and potential tactical situations, siting of structures and realignment of structure types developed the need for additional trenching. The additional cost of trenching was estimated to be approximately \$110,000.

During this period work progressed without delay, 21% overall completion had been attained. The ~~Sea Bees~~ were averaging 1% completion per day. 8,173 man-days of the estimated 33,000 has been expended. Despite delays due to the crisis and revision in scope, the MLR was still scheduled for completion on 1 January 1963. The total project however, could not be completed without the additional funds.

By 24 November, the hardened positions on the Windward MLR were 71% complete and on the Leeward MLR, 61% complete.

The Cuban crisis ended; however, not for the CBs at GTMO. Work progressed but under monetary restraint. Additional initiative was called upon. Every effort was made to cancel obligations for material not required immediately to allow continued operation for as long as possible. Some \$30,000 was obtained from this source enabling both battalions to continue working at least until the writing of this documentary. It looks right now that MCB 4 will be returned home for Christmas and a well deserved rest. Reduction in force at GTMO will save some money and permit continuation of MCB 7 at a decelerated pace.

ANNEX FSALVAGE AND TOWING

On 23 Oct, COMSERVLANT began planning support of the COMPHIBLANT contingency requirement for an increased towing and salvage capability in the Caribbean area. In order to accomplish this support, the following objectives were established:

A. TOWING

(1) Support of Army requirement for positioning 2 Army barges and 1 YD in Port Everglades and 1 YD in Tampa. In order to accomplish this support, it was decided to assign appropriate ATF's to tow these craft to the staging area in Florida. The ATF were then to be repositioned at West Palm Beach, Miami and Tampa for the purpose of allowing upkeep time while maintaining readiness to implement the towing requirement under COMPHIBLANT Contingency OPLAN.

(2) Continue to support Project Might with the ATF stationed at GTMO.

B. SALVAGE

(1) Support salvage requirements of COMPHIBLANT Operation Plan. The ships mentioned above plus the 1 ATF at GTMO, 1 ARS/ARSD at CHASN, 2 ATF at Mayport and CHASN, the 1 ARS at SJUAN and 1 ATF at NORVA were assigned to meet the OPLAN requirements.

(2) Load participating ARS/ARSD to full capacity of demolition explosives.

(3) Establish a pool of 21 divers for distribution by COMSERVRON EIGHT.

On 27 Oct, the following embarked units had been alerted:

SALINAN	NRLNS	PAPAGO	GTMO
MOSOPELEA	CHASN	LUISENO	GTMO
SHAKORI	LCREEK	PRESERVER	NORVA
ATAKAPA	LCREEK	PAIUTE	MAYPORT
SENECA	LCREEK	HOIST	SJUAN
WINDLASS	LCREEK	YFNB-17	NORVA

LUISENO, although alerted, did not have full towing power, having experienced a main motor casualty. She was RFS 11/7/62 and departed GTMO 11/8/62.

During this period, USS OXFORD maintained her operations schedule with USS PEREGRINE (EMSF-373) assigned as escort.

ANNEX F (CONT'D)

On 24 Oct, with extremely short notice the OPPORTUNE and SHAKORI sailed from LCREEK and rendezvoused with the USS HYADES, USS DUXBURY BAY, USS DESOTO COUNTY, USNS UPSHUR to transfer warm clothing to service dependents evacuated from GTMO. On 25 Oct, the transfer was effected.

C. CONTINGENCY

On 29 Oct, USS WINDLASS (ARSD-4) sailed from LCREEK to Mayport to serve as a ready salvage unit. VULCAN departed Norfolk with 5 tons of demolition explosives for replenishment of harbor clearance units. 15 more tons of explosives were concurrently prepositioned at CHASN for the same purpose.

D. SALVAGE SUPPORT

CNO 292149Z OCT 62 established a 21 diver allowance under COMSERVLANT for use as a contingency pool. No actual divers were received.

On 29 Oct, USS ATAKAPA departed Norfolk enroute Morehead City with YD-200 in tow to raise a Marine Corps 50 ton howitzer, sunk in 25 feet of water.

E. ARMY TOW REQUIREMENTS

On 3 Nov, USS SALINAN sailed from New Orleans to Tampa with a 100 ton YD (BD-6662) in tow.

F. PROJECT MIGHT

USS PAIUTE departed Mayport 4 Nov for GTMO with YC-1031 and YC-1032 in tow. These barges were loaded with aggregate for use in support of Project Might.

G. ARMY TOW REQUIREMENTS

On 6 Nov, USS SENECA sailed from NORVA for Port Everglades with an Army Barge in tow. USS SHAKORI departed NORVA towing a 100 ton YD for the same destination.

On 5 Nov, USS MOSOPELEA departed Port Everglades with Army barge BG-6222 in tow.

On 6 Nov, USS MOSOPELEA arrived Port Everglades with the Army barge. MOSOPELEA was then repositioned in West Palm Beach.

H. SUPPORT OF NAVBASE SAN JUAN

As directed by CINCLANTFLT, COMSERVRON EIGHT arranged for the movement of 5 service craft under tow to San Juan as follows:

<u>CRAFT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOWING SHIP</u>	<u>ETD</u>	<u>ETA</u>
YON-253 YTM-755	CHASN	PAIUTE	20 NOV	27 NOV
YON-254 YFU-1	NORVA	KIOWA	17 NOV	27 NOV
YON-255 YON-256	CHASN	UTINA	20 NOV	26 NOV

These craft were needed by COMNAVBASE San Juan prior to 28 November to enable him to adequately support the large concentration of **naval forces** in the Caribbean area.

I. PROJECT MIGHT SUPPORT

On 8 November, USS PAIUTE arrived GTMO with the YC-1031 and YC-1032 loaded with aggregate.

J. ARMY TOW AND 314 SUPPORT

On 10 November, USS SENECA and USS SHAKORI arrived Port Everglades with the Army fuel barge and the Army YD. At this point with all tows completed, COMSERVLANT salvage support was in readiness. The situation on 10 November, was as follows:

<u>SHIP OR UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SHIP OR UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
SALINAN*	TAMPA	LUISENO	ENR NEWPORT
MOSOPELEA*	WEST PALM BEACH	PAIUTE	MAYPORT
SHAKORI*	MIAMI	WINDLASS	MAYPORT
ATAKAPA	NORVA	HOIST	SAN JUAN
SENECA*	PORT EVERGLADES	PRESERVER	BERMUDA
PAPAGO	GTMO		

\* Army tow support. All others supporting COMPHIBLANT 314. Army Units: Port Everglades 2 fuel barges 1 YD, Tampa 1 YD.

K. PROJECT MIGHT AND 314 SUPPORT

On 12 November, USS SENECA relieved USS PAPAGO at GTMO. USS WINDLASS shifted from Mayport to Charleston.

ANNEX F (CONT'D)

On 15 November, SENECA departed GTMO for Kingston, Jamaica with YC-1031 and YC-1032 in tow. After these barges were loaded with aggregate, SENECA returned them to GTMO for Project MIGHT.

L. SERVICE CRAFT FOR SAN JUAN

On 17 November, USS UTINA departed NORVA for CHASN to pick up two barges for tow to San Juan, while USS KIOWA departed Norfolk for San Juan with the YON-254 and the YFU-1 in tow. KIOWA ran into heavy weather. After several days of riding out the storm, she put into Morehead City for inspection of her tows. YFU-1 was found to be in unsatisfactory condition for further ocean towing. She was transferred to COMFIVE for repairs and inland movement to Key West.

On 20 November, KIOWA departed Morehead City for San Juan with YON-254 in tow. WINDLASS departed Charleston for Morehead City to conduct salvage OPS at Onslow Beach.

M. 314 SUPPORT

On 23 November, OPPORTUNE departed Norfolk for Charleston as ready salvage unit to replace WINDLASS previously shifted to Charleston.

N. SERVICE CRAFT FOR SAN JUAN

On 24 November, PAIUTE lost YON-253 which sank at 24-17N 71-48W in 2900 fathoms of water. PAIUTE continued to San Juan with YFM-755 in tow, arriving on 27 November. KIOWA arrived the same day with YON-254. UTINA had already arrived the day before with YON-255 and YON-256.

O. USS LAWE TOW

During the latter part of the quarantine operation, USS W.C. LAWE (DD-763) grounded entering San Juan Harbor. On 27 November USS KIOWA departed San Juan for Mayport with LAWE in tow, arriving Mayport on 6 December.

ANNEX GNUCLEUS PORT CREWS

On 26 October, the Officer in Charge of Nucleus Port Crew No. 4 visited COMSERVLANT Headquarters to ascertain what logistic support would be provided his unit in the event CTF 128 OPLAN 314B-62 was executed. This plan requires the use of two nucleus port crews, one of which was identified as No. 4 from COMFIVE. Support by the operational commander could not be confirmed, and it was decided to use advanced base functional component material. A message was sent to CNO requesting release of functional components and stating a requirement for initial sum of \$25,000 for payment of indigenous stevedore labor. The cognizant material bureaus, Naval Districts, supply points, and operational commanders were information addressees. The release was immediately granted by CNO and the material bureaus directed the supply points to ready the material for shipment when required by COMSERVLANT.

The Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Commanding Officer pointed out the activation of Nucleus Port Crew No. 4 was contrary to the intent of OPNAV Instruction 005440.6 which stated that the crews to be activated in an emergency should be drawn from the area least affected by the tempo of operations. Consequently, CINCLANTFLT requested authorization to activate Nucleus Port Crew No. 1 (COMTWELVE) and Nucleus Port Crew No. 3 (COMTHREE), on 7 November.

COMTHREE had been alerted by telephone on 27 October that planning called for activation of Nucleus Port Crew No. 2. The Officer in Charge of Nucleus Port Crew No. 2 called back that day, stated that he had been aboard three weeks, had attended one of their monthly meetings, that the crew members were scattered throughout the Third Naval District, but that he would alert them, see that they had the proper immunization shots, and be ready when called for. He was informed that COMEASTSEAFRON held a copy of the plan (neither COMTHREE nor COMTWELVE had been furnished the CTF 128 OPLAN 314B-62) and was asked to review the functional components.

On 13 November, the Officers in Charge of Nucleus Port Crew No. 1 and No. 2 attended a conference at CINCLANTFLT with representatives of CINCLANTFLT, COMPHIBLANT and COMSERVLANT. They were briefed on the very flexible plans for their employment, i.e., any of several ports might be utilized, the amphibious group might reembark and move on, leaving the Nucleus Port Crew to receive resupply material, facilities, and indigenous labor might or might not be available, etc. The Officers in Charge pointed out they are not self-sustaining and if not fully supported by the operational commander they would require additional personnel, equipment and material. Each crew would also require funds, roughly estimated at \$250,000 to pay indigenous labor for stevedoring.

SECRET

ANNEX G (CONT'D)

CINCLANTFLT reaffirmed that COMSERVLANT is the type and administrative commander of Nucleus Port Crews assigned to CINCLANTFLT. To this time, COMSERVLANT has been unable to ascertain what logistic support will be provided by the operational commander.



SECRET

ANNEX H

CARGO HANDLING BATTALION ONE

Period 22 thru 28 October 1962

On 23 October 1962, Cargo Handling Battalion ONE, commanded by CDR Elbert S. RAWLS, Jr., SC, USN, and consisting of six officers and 130 men, was ordered to standby for outloading from Cheatham Annex and upon arrival Morehead City, N.C., report to the Commanding General, SECOND Marine Division.

Following the release of Project TARE material by the Chief of Naval Operations, the USS CHEBOYGAN COUNTY (LST-533) was nominated to lift the Battalion and arrived at Cheatham Annex, Williamsburg, Virginia at 1700 on 24 October. Loading of Project TARE material commenced at 1800 and was completed at 0730 on 25 October. The ship departed Cheatham at 0800, 25 October and arrived at Morehead City at 1400 on 27 October. Off-loading began and was completed on 28 October.

In addition to the Project TARE material located at Cheatham Annex, 10 vehicles and approximately 400 L/T of TARE material was located at Davisville, R.I. On 23 October, arrangements were made to have the vehicles driven to Morehead City and arrangements were completed to ship the 400 L/T of material by truck.

Status of Cargo Handling Battalion ONE and detachments as of 28 October; main body at Morehead City; detachments HOTEL and LIMA, 22 men at GTMO; detachments JULIETT and KILO, 1 officer and 40 men on DEEP FREEZE 63; detachment INDIA, 35 men on USS ARCTURUS deployed with the SIXTH Fleet.

29 October to 4 November 1962

COMSERVLANT advised COMPHIBLANT that COMFIVE and COMSIX loading out plans provided for port commanders, stevedores and terminal services including supplementing and replacing Cargo Handling Battalion ONE in initial loadout of FMFLANT material in 5th and 6th Naval District ports.

The Project TARE materials shipped from Davisville, R.I., arrived at Morehead City, N.C., during the period 29 October - 4 November.

Cargo Handling Battalion ONE unit strength was 7 officers and 171 men as a result of the return of Detachment LIMA reporting from duty at GTMO and men reporting under normal orders issued previously.

5 to 11 November

Cargo Handling Battalion ONE remained on an alert status at Camp Lejeune, N.C. during this period conducting check of Project TARE material and personnel training.

ANNEX H (CONT'D)12 to 18 November 1962

Receipt of additional personnel during this period raised the strength of Cargo Handling Battalion ONE to 7 officers and 213 men. Intensive training of personnel continued at Camp Lejeune, N.C.

19 to 25 November 1962

No change in status or location of Cargo Handling Battalion ONE.

25 November to 10 December 1962

Cargo Handling Battalion ONE, Detachment HOTEL consisting of 14 men reported from deployment at GTMO raising strength of the Battalion to 7 officers and 217 men. Remaining personnel maldeployed during this period:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>No. Men</u>	<u>No. Officers</u>	<u>Commitment</u>
JULIETT	10	0	DEEP FREEZE 63
KILO	30	1	DEEP FREEZE 63

During this period Cargo Handling Battalion ONE was ordered to return to Cheatham Annex, Williamsburg, Virginia, and the lift was accomplished by LST on 9 December 1962. On 10 December, Cargo Handling Battalion ONE was chopped to COMSERVLANT for operational control.

ORDNANCE CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN OPERATIONSPRE-CRISIS2 October

The first COMSERVLANT ordnance requirement generated by CINCLANTFLT 012312Z was COMNAVAIRLANT 022027Z requesting the positioning of aviation ammunition in the Jacksonville, Cecil Field, Sanford Complex. This request had to be revised by COMSERVLANT to comply with standard bomb fuze requirements, and reviewed to compare with on hand stocks at these stations. COMSERVLANT had laid on shipment in approximately one hour after receipt. 481 tons were shipped from Charleston and Yorktown.

3 October

COMSERVLANT requested 30 BULLPUP be transferred from Yorktown to NAS, Jacksonville and 30 to NAS Cecil Field on Priority 2. COMSERVLANT issued 292 SIDEWINDERS and 108 SPARROWS on a Priority 2 to NAS Cecil Field. Fifty SIDEWINDERS were issued to MCAS Beaufort on a Priority 7. A total of 115 tons were shipped.

4 October

In compliance with CINCLANTFLT 022210Z, COMSERVLANT computed ammunition to be removed or retained at Guantanamo. CG FMFLANT specified CLOUD VA items to be retained at GTMO. COMSERVLANT recomputed fuze requirements and specified CLOUD items to be loaded in DIAMOND HEAD for transfer to Roosevelt Roads. COMSERVLANT 042207Z to NAVSTA, GTMO and DIAMOND HEAD specified items to be removed from GTMO. GTMO 062047Z specified additional items to be retained. This was reviewed in relation to CLOUD and AIRLANT requirements and modified accordingly. In order to meet VMA-331 requirements, COMSERVLANT directed DIAMOND HEAD to offload additional items at Roosevelt Roads and gave Roos Roads permission to offload other accessible items to replenish stocks. This apparently was done and the lack of an inventory as to what was removed posed later problems in redistribution of items presumably offloaded at Earle.

9 October

COMSERVLANT shipped 50 SPARROW III missiles from NWS YORKTOWN to NAS KEY WEST. 15.5 tons.

15 October

COMSERVLANT ser 20/0639 of 16 Oct to BUWEPS requested information concerning availability of exploder mechanisms Mk 19 Mod 9 for Torpedo Mk 43 Mod 1 and requested repair of unserviceable mechanisms be expedited in view of the shortage to meet fleet requirements.

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ANNEX I (CONT'D)

17 October

COMASWFORLANT 151707Z Oct, and COMNAVAIRLANT 171839Z Oct, concurred with interim Mk 43/33 load proposal of COMSERVLANT ser 0599 of 26 Sep 1962 with minor modifications. COMCRUDESANT did not concur in reduced load but recommended that every effort be made to accelerate production and delivery of new torpedoes.

19 October

CINCLANTFLT directed USS WRANGELL to load 200 fire bombs, Mk 79, and sail in support of SECONDFLT. Notification was received Friday afternoon and ship was ready Saturday afternoon. As a result of this load, 200 fire bombs each were added to standard loads of NITRO and DIAMOND HEAD loading at Earle.

21 October

CGFMFLANT requested delivery of CLOUD VA MOUNTOUT ammunition to KEY WEST by 25 October. On 22 to 24 October, NWS Yorktown shipped 461 tons by truck and NAD ST JULIENS CREEK shipped 103 tons by truck.

(1) Offload of excess ammunition (mainly CLOUD VA and torpedoes) completed at Roos Roads.

(2) CINCLANTFLT requested that 60 SPARROW and 174 SIDEWINDER be shipped to KEY WEST on Priority 2. 40 tons were air-shipped.

(3) COMSERVLANT directed loading of 44 each Mk 34 Mod 1 torpedoes aboard USS HYADES at GTMO for shipment to NWS YORKTOWN.

CRISIS BEGINS WEEK ONE

22 October

In order to maintain inventory records of critical items, COMSERVLANT requested BUWEPFLTREADREPLANT to provide a weekly inventory of critical items from coastal NAD's. The subsequent reports provided valuable information and expedited the flow of requisitions. COMNAVAIRLANT requested SIDEWINDER and 20MM gun ammunition at GTMO for training of VU-10 at GTMO, a new requirement. A portion of the gun ammunition was provided from Roosevelt Roads stock previously removed from GTMO and additional quantities were provided from new production. On 22 October, COMSERVLANT directed shipment of 6 tons photoflash cartridges from YORKTOWN and MCAS CHERRY POINT to KEY WEST, as requested by CG SECOND MAW.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX I (CONT'D)23 October

USS DIAMOND HEAD (AE-19) was directed to proceed to Earle, N. J. and load fleet issue ammunition. USS NITRO (AE-23) was already in Earle. COMSERVLANT requested that Chief, BUWEPS direct NAD Earle to work around the clock loading DIAMOND HEAD and NITRO.

CNO 191813Z released CLOUD material to CMC. Majority of CLOUD ammo is being loaded out. COMSERVLANT 232243Z requested BUWEPS to move CLOUD VA first resupply to NAD, CHASN and NAVWPNSTA, YKTN and to fill shortages. This message also requested East Coast depots be stocked with CONUS assets of critical items. No BUWEPS action was taken on this latter request.

INDEPENDENCE requested 430, 250# and 84, 500# high drag bombs with box fins and delay fuzes. This demonstrates a need to review CVA and AE load lists to allow for the use of high drag bombs on AD and A3D A/C. Fuze speed restrictions on high drag bombs do not affect these A/C and the A3D can carry twice as many high drag bombs as low drag bombs. Modifying CVA bomb loads would slightly reduce total quantity of bombs carried, but would increase the number of overall jet sorties with low drag bombs.

BUWEPS advised that CNO had released Storm Navy material, with shipments to be made as directed by CG FIFTH MEB.

Since JOHN KING was in shipyard at the time Cuban operations began, some 20 of her offloaded missiles were loaded in BIDDLE to improve the latter's readiness. KING was loaded upon completion of her availability.

COMFAIRWINGSLANT requested 8 torpedoes be positioned at NAS PAX RIVER. This was the first of many requests for unexpected positioning of torpedoes which was met by accelerating rework of nose sections and assembly at YKTN and by airshipment of 200 new production Mk 44's from KEYPORT. PAX RIVER shipment eventually resulted in the premature activation of one torpedo due to handling by inexperienced personnel.

24 October

Work was begun in offloading the balance of excess GTMO ammunition from DIAMOND HEAD at NAD, Earle.

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ANNEX I (CONT'D)

24 October

COMWESTFOR urgently requested 90 complete ZUNI pods. COMSERVLANT requisitioned necessary components and informed originator that Marine stocks were available in the interim. CGFMFLANT Reps did not look favorably on this proposal. The 90 pods were in KEY WEST within 4 days.

NAS, Jacksonville requested 20 torpedoes, Mk 43 Mod 1 complete warshots, to fill requirements. Mk 34-1 acceptable substitute. From NAVWPNSTA YORKTOWN, COMSERVLANT provided 20 torpedoes Mk 34 Mod 1 and associated components to NAS JACKSONVILLE.

USS ENTERPRISE requested 3,016 wafer switches which were air-shipped to GTMO on 26 October FFT ENTERPRISE.

COMSERVLANT directed shipment of 6 tons Mk 6 smoke lights from MCAS CHERRY POINT to BRUNSWICK.

COMNAVAIRLANT 242309Z disclosed that M990 electric fuze could not be used on MBR without AERO 2B-1 box arming unit. CVAs replaced fuzes from AE stocks. This resulted in stripping the AE's of mechanical fuzes and adapter boosters temporarily making MAZAMA CLOUD bomb stocks useless. 35 tons of fuzes were later flown to Roos Roads for transfer to MAZAMA. It further disclosed a serious shortage in the bomb fuze and adapter booster for mechanical fuzing of low drag bombs. BUWEPS procurement was apparently based on 25% mechanical fuzing for electric bombs. The sudden need for 100% mech fuzing created the shortage. COMNAVAIRLANT requested BUWEPS to expedite fix on MBR in order to use electric fuzes.

25 October

Since Basic TARTAR were in short supply and loadouts were required, all material was consolidated by shipping all NAD components and whole rounds to NAVWPNSTA, Yorktown (COMSERVLANT ltr ser 20/0660 of 25 Oct). All Basic TARTAR loadouts were made at YORKTOWN. This action enabled 13 extra rounds to be prepared for BARNEY's load.

CTF 135 252341Z stated M173 Fuze and M23 igniters for Mk 79 Fire Bomb have very low reliability and "strongly" desired replacement with M173A1 and M23A1. COMNAVAIRLANT requested replacement quantity for all CVAs. Requisitions were cut and material air-shipped to Roos Roads. COMSERVLANT cancelled replacements for Med CVA's prior to shipment due to investigation that disclosed no discrepancy with these fuzes from other sources and no official report to OSO.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 October

COMNAVAIRLANT 25190Z stressed an immediate requirement for 38,000 SUS and 24,600 Marine Markers at Argentia, Keflavik and Lajes. COMSERVLANT requested reconsideration due to this being total Atlantic assets at this time. COMNAVAIRLANT stated this was an ultimate requirement with no immediate necessity. Later Telecons to provide needed requirements requested that SUS and Smoke Signals be positioned in relation to COMNAVAIRLANT letter serial 0030 of 21 February 1962, with 5 SUS per positioned sonobuoy. This would require a total of 6,040 SUS. 8,000 are in position, therefore, no action was taken on COMNAVAIRLANT message.

COMSERVLANT directed NAS QUONSET POINT to ship 10 tons SUS components to NAS NORFOLK. Shipment was made by truck 29 October.

In order to alleviate the shortage of torpedoes in the blockade force, 10 torpedoes from NEWPORT tenders were loaded in BIDDLE FFT NEOSHO FFT to DD's short. COMSERVRON 2 251830Z.

26 October

COMSERVLANT airshipped 4,000 SUS components (11 tons) to BERMUDA per Telecon COMFAIRWINGSLANT.

COMSRUDESANT 251455Z Oct. to CINCLANTFLT reported shortage torpedoes Mk 37/44 and ASROC to meet combatant shipfills for ships assigned the Cuban quarantine. COMSERVLANT 021921Z Nov. allocated 27 torpedoes Mk 37 due to LANTFLT from Nov. production to COMCRUDESANT to partially alleviate above shortage. NAVWPSNSTA, Yorktown was requested by COMSERVLANT to screen all 19-9 exploder mechs on hand and advise any serviceable quantity available.

27 October

USS ESSEX requested photoflash cartridges for current operations. No CVS requirements had been promulgated prior to this. Similarly, USS ENTERPRISE 310240Z requested 400 photoflash cartridges on Priority 2. Air shipments were made.

COMSERVLANT requested prepositioning of 51 tons demolition material at NAD Charleston for COMSERVRON EIGHT.

28 October

USS WASP departed for operation area without adequate supply of SUS. A requisition had been submitted on 10/22 to COMSERVLANT and was passed to NAS, Norfolk for action, info WASP. WASP did not notify stations as to delivery point and assumed she would get them from Yorktown by barge. Material was partially flown out by COD and the remainder put aboard DENEbola which had difficult time in meeting rendezvous. BUWEPS advised the procurement of SUS is being accelerated; that ammunition stocks were moving to East Coast depots; that CLOUD VA first resupply status was at high priority, and that aviation ordnance items were being expedited.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX I (CONT'D)

28 October

NAD Crane advised that 1/3 CLOUD first resupply had been shipped to NAD Charleston and 2/3 to NWS Yorktown as requested by COMSERVLANT.

Since there was no afloat missile backup for SECONDFLT units involved in Cuban operations, all available TERRIER, 40 BW-0 and BW-1, were designate to be loaded in NITRO for CAG-2/DLG support (COMSERVLANT ltr ser 20/0662 of 28 Oct).

23 tons of fire bombs and components for reconstitution of MAZAMA CLOUD material and base defense ammunition for NAVSTA ROOS RDS were loaded on USS VULCAN FFT NAVSTA ROOS RDS, ETA 2 November.

WEEK TWO

29 October

Usage rate of underwater sound signals has doubled that anticipated. Release of the Mk 61 SUS and two-shift operations at production plants provided some relief, but shortage is still considered critical as current production is about equal to expenditures and stocks will support only six weeks usage at current rates. Fuzes and Radhaz materials for carrier were shipped to TF 135 while replenishment items withdrawn from CLOUD aboard USS MAZAMA (AE-9) were shipped to Roosevelt Roads. Loading of two AE's was delayed this week as USS DIAMOND HEAD (AE-19) was drydocked in New York to effect repairs to stern tube and shaft, and USS NITRO (AE-23) required repairs to a cargo elevator.

30 October

OSO Mechanicsburg advised that action had been taken to fill all CLOUD first resupply shortages at NAD Charleston and NWS Yorktown, and that continued shortages existed in fuze requirements and low drag bombs.

COMASWFORLANT 300444Z advised CINCLANTFLT of limited availability of SCAT and recommended initial distribution with proposed COMASWFORLANT control.

OSO reported the fuze shortages to all concerned. This message advised that no immediate relief was possible in adapter boosters needed by the 100% mechanical fuzing of low drag bombs.

COMSERVLANT directed shipment of 7 tons SUS sections from NAB Norfolk to GTMO by air.

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31 October

BUWEPS 311525Z to all NAD's requested priority action to process unsegregated items, initiate maximum repairs of non-ready-for-use items and ensure accurate asset reporting of critical ammunition items.

COMSERVLANT 313027Z, in response to the withdrawal of CLOUD stocks from MAZAMA, recommended to CINCLANTFLT that, although CLOUD as a general rule should be protected, emergency issues to other using activities should be authorized.

COMSERVLANT requested ammunition issues and receipts by AEs be reported in daily SITREP from CTG 48.1 and CTG 48.2.

COMSERVLANT 312259Z OCT concurred with COMASWOFORLANT 300444Z SCAT control concept and stated COMSERVLANT would distribute as requested by COMASWOFORLANT. CINCLANTFLT concurred in concept.

1 November

BUWEPS reported that a number of MK 7 Mod 1 TDD's used in HT-3 TERRIER and Improved TARTAR were defective and had to be replaced. COMSERVLANT arranged shipment of replacement TDD's to ships affected. After shipment, NAVWPNSTA Yorktown reported that replacements themselves were defective and had been placed in a "HOLD" status. Further replacements had to be shipped. This was the only error affecting SAM during the Cuban operations and was due to the pace of operations at Yorktown.

COMPHIBLANT requested that large quantities of 5"/38 WP and ILLUM be made available on short notice. This demanded emergency truck shipments to NAD CHASN and ST JULIENS from NAD MC ALESTER and Bangor, Washington, since East Coast stocks were inadequate. Shipments arrived 12, 13 and 14 November (TELCON OSO - COMSERVLANT, 1 NOV, initiated the action).

COMSERVLANT loaded MK 6 Jato units in USS VALCOUR FFT NAVSTA Bermuda.

CGFMFLANT 011926Z requested COMSERVLANT move NAD EARLE CLOUD VA MOUNT OUT to NORVA area. This was done via USS NITRO.

2 November

COMSERVLANT loaded MK 6 Jato units in USS PRESERVER at Yorktown FFT NAVSTA Bermuda.

CNO 021933Z NOV asked COMNAVAIRLANT and COMNAVAIRPAC for ASW stores usage report for period 22 to 30 OCT and bi-monthly thereafter.

COMNAVAIRLANT 022029Z laid on their subordinate units the requirement for a weekly message report to provide this information.

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ANNEX I (CONT'D)

2 November

COMSERVLANT informed COMSECONDFLT and others as to the status of the re-constitution of the MAZAMA CLOUD load.

3 November

COMSERVLANT requested air shipment 10 torpedoes MK 43 Mod 1 from Roosevelt Roads to GTMO per CTU 81.7.9 312245Z OCT. With CINCLANTFLT concurrence, provided replacement torpedoes MK 34-1 and 14 additional propulsion batteries from NAVWPNSTA, Yorktown to Roosevelt Roads.

WEEK THREE

5 November

COMSERVLANT requested BUWEPs to ship critical supply designated ammunition, made available by their accelerated segregation, assembly and renovation program, to Yorktown, St. Juliens Creek and Charleston.

DIAMOND HEAD shifted from New York to Earle, N. J. to load.

COMSERVLANT directed shipment of 20 torpedoes MK 43 from NAVWPNSTA, Yorktown to NAS Key West. These units were now available at NAVWPNSTA from rework after receipt new nose section. (10 torpedoes air-shipped 6 NOV, remaining 10 on 7 NOV).

COMSERVLANT requested NAVWPNSTA, Yorktown provide 11 batteries MK 61 Mod 0 to USS RIGEL at NAVBASE, NORVA FFT USS ESSEX.

COMASWFORLANT 051949Z NOV recommended to CINCLANTFLT that an emergency issue pool of 50 torpedoes MK 43 be established; 10 at NAS, Norfolk for maximum response to meet emergency requirement. 44 to be air launch configured and 6 to be surface launch.

7 November

COMSERVLANT 070011Z NOV changed USS LEXINGTON load list to include SPARROW. This was caused by shift of embarked aircraft.

COMSERVLANT requested NAVSTA ROOS ROADS to advise status and time phasing of VIEQUES ammunition storage.

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ANNEX I (CONT'D)

7 November

COMSERVLANT 070011Z requested SARATOGA to modify bomb fuzing on her load request serial 0260 of 31 October. It further requested modification of ZUNI requirements to comply with standard components and directed loading of old type bombs with box fins to prevent future unnecessary drain on AE's.

8 November

COMSERVLANT 081611Z to BUSHIPS and BUWEPS requested development of plans to install liquid BULLPUP carrying capability in LANTFLT AE's.

COMASWFORLANT requested acceleration of production and delivery and emergency buy of MK 6 smoke lights.

9 November

COMSERVLANT requested LANTFLT TYCOMS to offload all MK 6 smoke lights and replace with MK 5 smokes, except for CVS and AVPs.

COMSERVLANT initiated shipment of 900 rounds of 5"/38 ILLUM, 17 tons, to MONROVIA Pier 7 NORVA from NAD CHASN by truck to be loaded aboard on the 10th.

COMSERVLANT initiated shipment of 1,000 rounds 5"/38 charges, 19½ tons, to MONROVIA Pier 7 NORVA from NAD St. Juliens by truck.

BUWEPS 092127Z reported defective arming wire and attachments for tail fuzes for 250# and 500# Low Drag bombs. Fuzes armed in flight. With the shortage of nose adapter boosters, and unsafe tail fuzes, only electric fuzes can be used to a large extent and these are precluded by COMNAVAIRLANT 242309Z OCT until the MBR is fixed.

10 November

COMSERVLANT directed loading of 21 tons 5"/38 WP projectiles, 13.5 tons, of 5"/38 reduced charges and 2 tons MK 61 nose fuzes in USS TUTUILA.

BUWEPS directed shipment of ammunition handling equipment from (US to NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads to reduce workload backlog and for outfitting VIEQUES storage area.

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ANNEX I (CONT'D)

WEEK FOUR

12 November

DIAMOND HEAD completed loading at Earle on 14 NOV and proceeded to Yorktown for topping off.

13 November

INDEPENDENCE has urgent requisition for photo flash cartridges. 6 tons were air-shipped from Yorktown. COMSERVLANT has tried unsuccessfully in June 1962, to establish service usage rates (COMSERVLANT spdltr ser 20/4968 of 14 June). This requisition has resulted in another attempt (COMSERVLANT 141935Z NOV) which appears to be receiving satisfactory results. Reports are due on 1 December. Photo flash cartridges are in short supply and require justification in order to recommend procurement.

COMSERVLANT 130017Z reported to all concerned the steps taken to provide BL&P, illuminating, and WP projectiles, 5"/38 reduced charges, and MTF MK 61 fuzes to the contingency forces.

15 November

Due to postponement of CANBERRA's BW-1 conversion, COMSERVLANT ltr ser 20/0708 of 15 NOV. indicated that no requirement for shipment of BW-1's to east coast depots existed (originally planned by BUWEPS before postponement by BUWEPS ltr ser 06987 of 5 NOV).

COMSERVLANT began shifting the AE's in order to develop the following readiness posture: WRANGELL with TF 136, NITRO rearming TF 136, MAZAMA with CLOUD load and GREAT SITKIN operating south of Cuba were both supporting TF 135.

16 November

COMSERVLANT 162317Z to COMSECONDFLT, COMASWFORLANT and COMSOLANT, info to all Task Force Commanders, requested monthly training ammunition requirements in order to attempt positioning of necessary material to reduce priority air shipments.

17 November

COMSERVLANT 181501Z to CTF 137 provided a summary of ordnance logistics policy and was followed by mail transmittal of pertinent ordnance logistics instructions.

ANNEX I (CONTD'D)17 November

COMSERVLANT requested OSO Mechanicsburg fill CLASS VA STORM MOUNTOUT deficiencies in SS CONSTITUTION STATE for FIFTH MED loadout. Material was made available to NAVWPNSTA Yorktown but not loaded.

COMSERVLANT requested OSO Mechanicsburg to preposition 8" gun ammunition at East Coast tidewater depots to increase NGFS readiness.

19 November

COMSERVLANT 192137Z directed a shift in the gun type ammunition carried by AE's from 6" to 8" HC. This shift was directed in order to meet as nearly as possible the large expenditures anticipated by COMPHIBRON 2, 3, and 4 and the fact that no 6" cruisers were assigned to the contingency.

20 November

COMFAIRWINGSLANT 201719Z advised of 400 units Jato monthly requirement at GTMO for seaplanes commencing 15 December. COMSERVLANT 201409Z shipped 43.5 tons Jato units from NAVWPNSTA Yorktown to GTMO.

COMSERVLANT issued supply directive to NAD St. Juliens for shipment of 5"/38 BL&P/T projectiles to quarantine forces, some units of which were not normally allowed this type ammunition. The ammunition is to be used for warning shots.

COMSERVLANT directed shipment of 418 tons of gun ammunition to NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads for stowage at VIEQUES to support NGFS training.

23 November

COMSERVLANT requested that balance of TUTUILA cargo ammunition be offloaded at VIEQUES for storage and issue.

28 November

Early cessation of quarantine operations enabled CANBERRA's conversion to BW-1 capability to be rescheduled before Mediterranean deployment. COMSERVLANT 282219Z NOV submitted detailed recommendations to CINCLANTFLT. COMSERVLANT recommended that 148 BW-1's and components be shipped from west coast depots and that, failing that, at least 120 be shipped with remainder to be supplied by transfers from SURIBACHI upon CANBERRA's arrival MED - NITRO deploying with CANBERRA would keep 23 BW-1 as SIXTHFLT backup. BUWEPs approved the main recommendation and will provide 138 BW-1 for CAG-2 load (BUWEPs 302109Z NOV).

## ANNEX J

### OPERATION CHRISTMAS TREE

OPERATION CHRISTMAS TREE was initiated on 17 November when CINCLANTFLT initiated a message to BUPERS which stated that "due to probable prolonged disposition of task force units at sea, desire COMSERVLANT to arrange procurement and delivery of 700 Christmas Trees to Atlantic Fleet ships at sea during the holiday period."

BUPERS, in the above message was requested to furnish an outright grant of Welfare and Recreation funds in order to accomplish CINCLANTFLT's request. This they did immediately responding with "Request approved with pleasure, check mailed this date".

As of 26 November, ARCTURUS, with her normal provision and Operation Christmas Tree load, was scheduled to depart Norfolk on 30 November to replenish TF 135 and TGs 128.4 and 83.3 which were still in the Caribbean area. Subsequently, TG 128.4 was ordered to return to the Pacific and TF 135 ships were rotated. Consequently, an AF requirement no longer existed; and, therefore, ARCTURUS sailing was cancelled.

OPERATION CHRISTMAS TREE was completed within the next 10 days by delivery of the 700 trees to ships as they returned to homeports.

ANNEX K

MAINTENANCE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

OVERHAULS. The deferring and reinstating of overhauls resulted in slipping the overhaul of ANTARES to Fiscal Year 1964. Further, it is anticipated that work loads at shipyards and INDMANs will be extremely heavy with a possibility that more SERVLANT ships may have to be slipped or reprogrammed to other than scheduled INDMANs.

CANCELLING OF OVERHAULS AND INSURV INSPECTION. If the Cuban operations had continued over a three or four month period, the overhaul of SERVLANT ships involved, especially AEs, would have been extremely critical.

SHORTAGE OF R&T FUNDS. Shortage of R&T funds normally allotted to Naval Shipyards reduces the repair support that should be available to the type commander. Currently, COMSERVLANT has no funds in Project 16 to accomplish technical or restricted availabilities in Naval Shipyards.

CASREPs. In order for COMSERVLANT to stay aware of significant material failure and render maximum assistance to his ships, it is essential that CASREPs be submitted.

FUNDING SUPPLY OVERHAULS. Continued non-funding of deficiencies developed by supply overhauls results in more and more depletion of on board spares without replacement. Deficiencies of on board spare parts when needed could result in serious consequences.

REPAIR SHIPS & UTILITIES. The deployment of repair ships to support the fleet in close proximity to the scene of operations is essential. However, recognizing the inadequacies of the Naval Station Piers in Norfolk to provide services, especially steam and electricity so ships can go dead plant, selective deployment of AR type ships as the situation demands should be the guide. The Cuban operations clearly point out that ships on a standby steaming notice of 4 hours can not secure machinery for upkeep and repair. The establishment of teletype replacement pools on tenders and repair ships should be carried over to normal operations and continue efforts to train and staff repair ships with at least three qualified teletype repairmen at all times.

JP-4. Although the delivery of JP-4 at sea was a new requirement, carrying this product in AOG type ships for emergency operations is feasible.

TAO COMMUNICATIONS. The SCR-624 radio is bulky and difficult to assemble and is particularly difficult for inexperienced merchant crews to assemble.

BOILER CLEANING. During emergency situations the requirement to clean boiler firesides every 600 hours is difficult to comply with. However, cleaning of boilers in accordance with the above requirement should be adhered to as closely as possible to enable continued and sustained operations without suffering boiler casualties.

## ANNEX K (Con't)

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PROVISION, POL, STORES AND FLEET FREIGHT  
ISSUES/MOVEMENTS, PASSENGERS, MAIL AND AMMUNITION

## I. Provisions replenishment:

<u>AF</u>	<u>L/T Transferred</u>	<u>No. Ships Replenished</u>
ALDEBARAN	340	20
HYADES	540	19
DENEbola	687	36
RIGEL	<u>873</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTALS:	2,440	113

## II. AKS Material Replenishment:

	<u>M/T Transferred</u>	<u>No. Ships Replenished</u>
ALTAIR (AKS-32)	727	63

## III. Total POL Transferred:

NSFO	1,208 MBBL
JP-5	149 MBBL
AVGAS	42 MBBL

A total of 648 AO refueling were conducted.

## IV. Total Fleet Freight shipped from Norfolk:

Surface	769.5 S/T
Air	586.3 S/T

## V. Passengers.

Service Force Units transferred 1024 passengers by Highline and Helo.



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VI. Mail: Incomplete at this time - Following is the pounds of mail, above the average, routed to GTMO:

First Class - 5,641

Registered - 1,619

Air Mail - 25,300

Total: 27,560 - This is slightly over twice the normal.

VII. Ammunition: Report incomplete at this time.

3 AE - 243.9 S/T issued.

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ANNEX K (CONT'D)

SUMMARY - FLEET FREIGHT, PASSENGERS AND MAIL

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. FLEET FREIGHT - At the commencement of the Cuban operation, backlogs of both air and surface freight increased rapidly. A large portion of these backlogs was the result of the acceleration of the GTMO defense construction project. The response by MATS in furnishing increased air lift capacity was exceptional. This increased capacity along with maximum utilization of organic air lift capability resulted in excellent movement of air freight to both GTMO and ROOS RDS during the operation.

Problems with air shipments were encountered and these arose primarily at GTMO and ROOS RDS. The influx of air freight accelerated rapidly and backlogs increased. The cause of the problems was the inability of these activities either to adequately handle the volume because of personnel staffing and/or the unavailability, at times, of both COD aircraft and surface shipping which was needed to pick up and deliver the material to units at sea.

Surface freight movement problems were also experienced. The two SERVLANT AK ships are committed to support the deployed FBM tender complex. Consequently, no organic shipping was available to establish a regular and direct delivery of surface freight to task force units at sea. However, surface freight movement was accomplished, much less satisfactorily, by use of AF, AO, AKS and other organic units as available. This organic movement was supplemented through use of commercial bottoms making scheduled lifts in support of GTMO, ROOS RDS, SAN, JUAN, TRINIDAD, and KINGSTON. This latter commercial lift of fleet freight was the least satisfactory method since it resulted in double handling; increased the load on already overburdened activities in the Caribbean area; and required the use of either URG ships or combatants for pickup and delivery to units at sea.

2. MAIL. Almost a week after departure of ships from COMTS COMSERVLANT was advised as to where the Task Force Commanders wanted mail sent for their forces. At their decision, airmail

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and first class mail for TF 136 was routed to San Juan by commercial air from New York, N.Y., while parcel post was initially routed to Mayport, Florida. All classes of mail for TF 135 was routed to Guantanamo Bay, airmail and first class via all available government air flights from Norfolk, parcel post via surface ships sailing as available. Generally speaking, all classes of mail for TF 44 (less TG 44.9) was routed to Mayport, Florida. Mail for TG 44.9 was routed to San Juan-Roosevelt Roads during their stay in the Caribbean area. On their departure from Canal Zone, this force MOVREP erroneously requested mail SFRAN. This mail was thus cut off by COMSERVPAC and required additional messages to get it moving East again.

The volume of mail handled for Navy units at San Juan and Guantanamo Bay roughly doubled the workload on those post offices without a corresponding increase in postal personnel to handle the influx. Postal service at Mayport is normally provided by a small (third class) civil operated post office. The sudden arrival of mass volumes of mail for afloat forces could be accommodated only by the use of afloat postal personnel and working parties from Amphibious Force units in the area, with such assistance and facilities as could be provided by the Naval Station.

Postal service within CONUS is provided almost exclusively through the civil postal system which is not geared nor staffed for flexibility of mobility necessary to adequately provide service at points other than normal fleet bases. There is no pool of Navy postal personnel, either ashore or afloat, that can be shifted on short notice to handle mail or to augment Navy post offices overseas as necessary to handle the increased workload due to fleet concentrations.

ANNEX K (CONT'D)

SUMMARY - PROVISION AND STORES

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

AF: The AF ships operated very effectively although their operations were considerably handicapped because of communications backlogs of three or four days in some cases. The AF loads were more than adequate to support TF 135, 136, and TF 128.4. AF services were offered to TG 128.3 but were not utilized since the ships of this group were operating in and out of southern ports and requirements could be met at such ports.

Other than the above, no serious problems were encountered in AF operations except that the sudden cancellation of the Cuban operation generated an excess of provisions on board AF ships. However, the NSC, Norfolk, after considerable effort, was able to absorb and make use of these excesses.

AKS: The study of using Mayport as a base of operations for both the AKS and the AF ships indicated that lack of facilities rendered this plan infeasible. Therefore, it was determined to revert to using Norfolk for support of both type ships.

The ALTAIR began her initial AKS replenishing run when she departed Mayport on 10 November. By the time she had completed replenishing TF 135 and TG 128.4 and was enroute to provide services to TF 136, this latter force was dissolved. Although ALTAIR did not complete replenishment of all task forces, actual or probable problems arose and were contemplated in this type operation.

There had been some concern that due to the wide dispersal and rotation of ships and the difficulties encountered by some ships in delivering requisitions to ALTAIR, that there would be some problems involved in ALTAIR actually delivering all the material the ships needed. This situation actually developed and proved to be a serious problem. Additionally, the ALTAIR had difficulty in locating ships because of communication backlogs.

The ALTAIR, in spite of the above was able to perform her mission most effectively and her helicopter proved invaluable throughout her replenishment operation.

ANNEX K (Con't)MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONSSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As a result of Project MIGHT the following conclusions can be drawn:

Transportation will always be difficult. COMPHIBLANT proved a tower of strength in moving CBs into GTMO. Necessity compelled the use of SERVLANT ships to move both men and construction equipment, and finally commercial shipping was used to move the rolling stock required to construct the GTMO defenses. No permanent solution to the transportation problem is foreseen. Only flexibility, ingenuity and perseverance in making the best uses of availability can be relied on to get CBs and their equipment to their assigned stations.

Equipment and material readiness of the CBs was in the process of being improved when the Cuban crisis broke in all of its fury. CNO had authorized COMCBLANT to bring up the allowances of its units to full strength in August 1963. This process had not been completed. In any event, substantial additions were required since the construction of defense fortifications largely used earth moving equipment. Release of PWRS filled the bill, but the condition of the equipment after long storage threatens to raise once again questions as to the efficacy of such storage. The old question of commercial vs. military equipment seems sure to rise once again. Resolution of these questions must await analyzation of reports, but one thing that can be stated is that active CB units must be fully outfitted for all contingencies with an adequate back-up of specialized equipment available in the custody of COMCBLANT. Construction materials and spare parts or the funds to obtain them from NSF must be available on short notice.

The CBs are some 500 men below strength. This is no different from most units in the Armed Services. The situation has pointed up the value of CBs and the need to have the units at full strength. All possible efforts will be expended to keep the CBs as close to authorized strength as possible under the limitation of current PAP.

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The lack of adequate plans and specifications resulting in no definitive scope prior to construction results in the commitment of forces and funds to a cause that is unstable. This is most uneconomical, and increases in cost estimates over and above the norm are to be expected. This price must be paid for diving into major construction jobs such as this without a positive scope.

ANNEX K (Con't)

CARGO HANDLING BATTALION ONE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Cuban Operation verified the need for CHB-1 to be a combat ready unit, having a high degree of mobility with the capability of loading out and unloading Project CLOUD material within specified time frames.

The mobility of the unit was amply demonstrated in that, upon receipt of orders to load personnel and its supporting Project TARE material on an LST for transport to Morehead City, N.C., the Battalion completed loading promptly.

Although CHB-1 was not called upon to perform its mission certain lessons were learned during the operation which will require further study and the submission of specific recommendations.

Problem areas encountered are as follows:

a. CHB-1 deployed under strength primarily because of maldistribution of detachments which were located at NSD, GTMO, on the USS ARCTURUS operating in the MED and on DEEP FREEZE.

b. The bulk of Project TARE material was divided between two locations, Cheatham Annex and Davisville, R.I. The material at Cheatham Annex, when movement was ordered, was rapidly loaded on an LST along with the Battalion personnel for delivery to Morehead City, N.C. However, shipping was not available for movement of the material from Davisville, R.I. Therefore, arrangements were made to ship the material to Morehead, N.C. by trucks. This material arrived some seven days later.

c. Recently imposed requirements provided that the Battalion will assist in loading out at Morehead City, N.C. from E-Day through E-Day plus 6; and then embark on the first TAF (E+7). This requirement exists so that CHB-1 can be positioned to unload all Project CLOUD material in the objective area. This mission determination requires a stevedoring force capable of unloading

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26 TAK carrying 137,000 measurement tons of material and will require a support force of personnel in numbers sufficient to build, operate and maintain a tent encampment. Representatives of FMFLANT have indicated that CHB-1 is expected to be self-sustaining with the capability of subsisting as a separate and detached unit without outside support. This revised concept dictates a complete and detailed review of CHB-1 capabilities in terms of manpower, material and mobility.



ANNEX K (Con't)ORDNANCESUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The following lessons were learned or reaffirmed during the operations incident to the Cuban operations.

1. The necessity of conducting on a recurring basis full scale tactical drills involving preparation and loading of ordnance up to the point of aircraft launch or firing. The full extent of ordnance problems will not be known or apparent until drills such as this are conducted routinely. Drills would be invaluable training for ordnance handling crews, would demonstrate the capability of launching system, and would have demonstrated such inconsistencies as the incompatibility of the MBR with electric fuzes, the requirements for old style bombs with box fins and the requirements for delay fuzes.
2. The major effect of last minute tactical or operational decisions, on unexpected tactical requirements. Although the requirements for special ordnance as the shift of aircraft squadrons or ships to different bases is easily accomplished in the planning stages, the physical problems of logistics may prevent rapid realization of planning changes. The unplanned build-up of air squadrons in Florida just prior to the operations necessitated the eventual movements of over 1000 tons of ammunition to these bases in about 10 days and partially contributed to the weakening of the Seven Mile Bridge to Key West. The fuze changes in CVA's partially disarmed the bomb stocks of two AE's (for about ten days) until replacement fuzes could be air shipped to the Caribbean and reloaded. The large demand for 5"/38 reduced changes, BL & T/P, and WP outstripped the East Coast supply of these items. Replacement stocks were trucked from West Coast stocks. The NGFS requirement exceeded the East Coast stock of 8" projectiles. As a complicating factor, some of the stock shipped to fill these requirements were unserviceable and had to be reworked at East Coast depots prior to issue.
3. Critical shortages of ammunition stocks made mandatory a centralized control to effect an equitable distribution. By means of the control of critical items such as missiles, ASROC, torpedoes, bomb fuzes, and the relation of CLOUD to Navy stocks by COMSERVLANT and equitable distribution to support all users was achieved. Without this control, some operational commanders would not have received adequate stocks. A case in point is that of the earmarking of all Navy stocks in East Coast depots to CLOUD VA first resupply.
4. The early requirement for old style bombs and box fins for use by A3D aircraft revealed an inadequacy in the CVA load for these bombs and fins and in the AE load for these fins. The requirement for photo cartridges and SUS must also be studied.

ANNEX K (Con't)

5. The full extent of shortages in war reserve ammunition stocks will not be accurately known until these stocks are physically segregated and a detailed accounting made. The earmarking of CLOUD ammunition stock was made on inventory information at the various depots. The actual movement of these stocks disclosed additional shortages and highlighted the problem involved in a manner impossible to achieve in any other way.
6. The support of forces in extended areas outside normal resupply lines. The supplying of forces with special items in a minimum of time necessitated the use of every available means of transport. MSTIS does not normally book a shipment of less than 100 tons of ammunition to any one port. To meet the many special requirements of the Cuban operations, use was made of AR's, AD's, air shipments, ARS's, AF's and every other means possible. To meet these requirements it is essential that COMSERVLANT have up-to-date tactical information of the PIM of all shipping both combatant and auxiliary.
7. Communications: Despite the imposition of MINIMIZE, communications broke down in the early stages of the operations. This in turn caused the release of messages duplicating some actions and further contributing to the excess. One major contributing factor to this failure is current MILSTRIP procedures. The standard format of these messages has a built-in susceptibility to garbles and mis-interpretation.
8. Ammunition for special forces must be planned and procured in advance. In response to COMCBLANT letter serial 0128 of 1 November, and subsequent telcons, COMSERVLANT submitted requisitions for shipment of the balance of MCB 7 basic allowance of ammunition to GTMO, for shipment of complete basic ammunition allowance for MCB 6 to Camp Lejeune, and for assembly, earmarking and hold for 48 hour loadout at NAD St. Juliens Creek and NAVWPNSTA Yorktown for 15 days combat ~~assault~~ ammunition for MCBs 6 and 7. This action was taken on 16-18 November. Subsequent investigation indicates that MCB ammunition allowances require further refining and approval and procurement action is necessary to place MCB ammunition in the supply system.

ANNEX L

MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS

Overhauls

Recommend, at the onset of any future operation such as the Cuban operation, that overhaul schedules of ships involved be adjusted in order to permit overhauling of ships during emergency OPS.

Restricted & Technical Availability Funds in Naval Shipyard

Funds allocated to the type commanders for technical and restricted availabilities at Naval Shipyards should be interchangeable with the same type of funds allotted to INDMAN in order to give type commanders flexibility in assigning work, especially during an emergency situation.

Funding Supply Overhauls

Recommend that funds be made available for funding of supply overhaul deficiencies.

COMSTS Radio Officer

Recommend that COMSTS be requested to investigate the Radio Officer incident on SANTA YNEZ for recommendations to prevent future incidents of this type.

TTY Pools on AR

The establishment of teletype replacement pools on tenders and repair ships has been approved with six units each now on each SERVLANT repair ship.. The allowance of RM teletype repairman should be assigned to the Repair Department in tenders and repair ships vice the Operations Department.

TAO Communications

Recommend that 10 small portable units in the UHF or VHF range be provided COMSERVLANT for contingency use.

METU - MOSU

It appears that the technological change in the Navy, especially in electronic and ordnance systems will continue to outstrip the Navy personnel to maintain them. Therefore, recommend that METU-2 and MOSU Units be deployed with each repair ship and tender. In addition, it is recommended that two METU civilian engineers be deployed on board the UAG Flagship.

ANNEX L (Con't)FLEET FREIGHT, PASSENGERS AND MAIL - RECOMMENDATIONS1. GENERAL

Prior to the onset of the operation, it was recognized that it would be mandatory to collect and publish a reliable Fleet Locator Listing for coordination and distribution of fleet freight, passengers and mail. The above action was taken. However, due to the number of task forces involved and the rapid movement of units, inaccuracy in the Fleet Locator Listing arose.

To resolve the inaccuracy problem, it is recommended that action be taken to ensure the planned, as well as actual, scheduled movements of units be submitted to a central agency as far in advance as possible so that movement of freight, personnel and mail can be more intelligently planned and executed.

2. FLEET FREIGHT

AIR FREIGHT: During the operation, air freight lift capacity from Norfolk to the Caribbean area was beyond expectation. Backlogs were rapidly reduced and remained, fairly constantly, at acceptable levels. However, further study of this critical area is needed to ensure that a single coordinating and air transportation control agency may be established to ensure that maximum utilization of all available air space, both MATS and organic, will be made in the distribution of freight, passengers and mail.

SURFACE FREIGHT: Based on the problems encountered in moving surface freight, a strong need exists in COMSERVLANT for additional AK type ships, having underway transfer capability, for use in direct delivery of freight to units at sea.

3. MAIL.

That two (2) experienced Postal Clerks (PC1) be added to COMSERVLANT allowance to be used as "trouble shooters" during fleet exercises and other operations involving a large number of ships. These men would be available to be sent to the theatre of operation to assist local post office as feasible. But their most important function would be to provide on-scene coordination and keep COMSERVLANT advised of problem areas as they develop and possibly prevent certain situations from becoming critical.

That afloat units having more than one Postal Clerk, be prepared to provide an Assistant Postal Clerk to help with force mail at shore based post offices during critical periods as required.

ANNEX L (CONT'D)

PROVISIONS AND STORES - RECOMMENDATIONS

AF: Discounting communications problems which are covered elsewhere in this report, the following recommendations are submitted:

1. Conduct further review and study of the Provisions and BIG 20 automatic issue procedure in order to refine and improve this procedure.
2. In order to preclude generation of provision excess, COMSERVLANT recommend employment of AF ships.
3. When other TYCOMS make arrangements with bases to support their ships, such as occurred at San Juan, recommend that COMSERVLANT be an information addressee on such correspondence.

AKS: A real need exists to develop a rapid means of transmission of requisitions to the AKS within Task Force area of operations. Delivery of requisitions by aircraft beyond the range of helicopters appears to offer a more acceptable means than via rapid data transmission. It is recommended that this area be explored.

GENERAL: Although HUK, ASW Forces infrequently requested support other than POL, this operation again highlighted the need for a one-stop replenishment ship, such as an AOR, which would be capable of supporting ASW Carrier - groups deployed over wide areas. It is recommended that more emphasis be placed on AOR Construction.

ANNEX L (Con't)COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the NAVCOMSTAs give preferential handling to messages conveying **OPORDERS** and Plans over other messages of an equal precedence.
2. That the Fleet Commander, in this case, COMSECONDFLT, establish a broadcast for distributing traffic to the ships under his control and originating from his command. Such broadcast to be on-line and be keyed through a transmitter ashore at some NAVCOMSTA or from a transmitter on the flagship.
3. That the procurement and installation program for the KW 7 equipments be expedited for the major URG ships, especially those destined as flag-ships.
4. That the pool of teletypewriters be established in the tenders and repair ships for replacement during repairs in lieu of a ship being short of equipment. This would enable routine maintenance when equipment must remain on the line.
5. The amount of traffic handled by the URG Commanders during the Cuban Quarantine dictates the necessity for the procurement and installation of on-line transmitting equipment in the major URG ships.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**ANNEX L (Con't)**

**NUCLEUS PORT CREWS - RECOMMENDATIONS**

That planning for the employment of the Nucleus Port Crews and their support must be more explicit not only for this contingency but for others and for general war.

SECRET

ANNEX L (Con't)

MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS - RECOMMENDATION

1. Transportation - This a problem for which a positive recommendation for solution cannot be made at this time. Movements were made during this crisis and will be done so again in the next, however, the situation remains unhealthy.
2. Plans and Specs - Plans and specs should be available prior to starting construction of any project unless unlimited funds are available.
3. Equipment - NSA provides the support required to supplement the 5-P25As released. Funds for this support should be released as soon as possible.
4. MCBs - The 5 Atlantic Fleet MCBs should be brought to full strength in both men and equipment to provide adequate support of the fleet.



## ANNEX L (Con't)

CARGO HANDLING BATTALION - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. COMSERVLANT review the detrimental effects of CHB-1 Detachment mal-deployments and submit appropriate recommendations which will improve the readiness status of CHB-1.
2. A recommendation has previously been submitted to CNO, via the appropriate chain of command, requesting the positioning of all Project TARE material at Cheatham Annex, Williamsburg, Va.
3. COMSERVLANT request CG, FMFLANT to submit specific written support capabilities required of CHB-1. Upon receipt, CHB-1 submit revised manpower and material requirements necessary to support the CHB-1 mission.

ANNEX L (Con't)

ORDNANCE - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Fleet Commanders conduct full scale tactical drills involving ordnance.
2. Fleet Commanders ensure timely submission of ordnance logistic requirements in consonance with their Oplans.
3. BUWEPS expedite segregation and wall to wall inventory of NAD earmarked stocks.
4. That COMSERVLANT and COMNAVAIRLANT review AE and CVA load list.
5. CINCLANTFLT provide COMSERVLANT with up-to-date information of the PIM of all combatant and auxiliary shipping in similar emergencies.
6. In preparation of message MILSTRIP, where all coding remains the same in succeeding requisitions except for the serial number, stock number, and quantity, give full MILSTRIP code for first requisition, and for following requisitions, give only the serial number, the stock number, unit of issue, and quantity. Further, that the entire quantity of requisitions be included in the one message, rather than continuing the 7 line item limitation. Although this recommendation applies to ammunition, it may have broad application for other commodities. There would be no increase in clerical workload ashore, since the entire coding has to be transferred to working cards for each line item. The foregoing procedure is normally used by ammunition activities for telephone transmittal of MILSTRIP.
7. a. MCB ammunition basic allowance be reviewed and refined to include realistic requirements and NATO weapon ammunition, and be promulgated.  
b. Ammunition to support MCBs be procured and designated in reserve by BUWEPS in the ammunition supply system in locations specified by COMCBLANT.